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ABSTRACT
We study a model where a data collector obtains data from users
through a payment mechanism, aiming to learn the underlying state
from the elicited data. The private signal of each user represents her
knowledge about the state; and through social interactions each
user can also learn noisy versions of her social friends’ signals,
which is called ‘learned group signals’. Thanks to social learning,
users have richer information about the state beyond their private
signals. Based on both her private signal and learned group signals,
each user makes strategic decisions to report a privacy-preserved
version of her data to the data collector.We develop a Bayesian game
theoretic framework to study the impact of social learning on users’
data reporting strategies and devise the payment mechanism for the
data collector accordingly. Our findings reveal that, in general, the
desired data reporting strategy at the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
can be in the form of either a symmetric randomized response (SR)
strategy or an informative non-disclosive (ND) strategy. Specifically,
a generalized majority voting rule is applied by each user to her
noisy group signals to determine which strategy to follow. Further,
when a user plays the ND strategy, she reports privacy-preserving
data completely based on her group signals, independent of her
private signal, which indicates that her privacy cost is zero. We
emphasize that the reported data when a user plays the ND strategy
is still informative about the underlying state because it is based
on her learned group signals. As a result, both the data collector
and the users can benefit from social learning which drives down
the privacy costs and helps to improve the state estimation at a
given payment budget. We further derive bounds on the minimum
total payment required to achieve a given level of state estimation
accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the era of data analytics, the benefits of personal data collec-
tion are pronounced. Gathering personal data, such as customer
needs and product reviews, plays an increasingly critical role in
a variety of applications, including marketing, scientific research,
business and politics. However, recent controversies, such as the
Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal or the reveal of Uber’s post-
trip customer tracking practices, have given rise to major concerns
about the risks of the collection of personal data. In the absence
of privacy guarantees, users lose control over their personal data
against possible threats once it is submitted. As a result, users can
be unwilling to share their personal data, such as political opinions,
movie ratings, product reviews,which can relate to their characters
and lifestyles, unless they are sufficiently rewarded and are ensured
that the privacy of their shared data is protected adequately.
In this work, we study a market model in which users make
strategic decisions to sell privacy-preserved versions of their pri-
vate data to a data collector. Further, our analysis generalizes the
existing market models for private data collection [33] by incor-
porating the ubiquitous social interactions among users encoun-
tered in many settings in our everyday life. Specifically, we ask the
question of what is the desired data reporting strategies (from an
individual user perspective) and payment mechanisms (from a data
collector perspective), when users can learn noisy versions of their
friends’ data through social interactions. Intuitively, social interac-
tions among the users can help them to become better-informed,
which in turn can impact their decision strategies by improving
the quality of their data reporting. The focus of this study is to
quantify the impact of the social learning on privacy-preserving
data collection in this market model.
1.1 Data Collection, Social Learning and
Privacy Leakage
Consider a real-world setting where an online platform (data col-
lector), such as IMDB, Flixster or Netflix, aims to collect, in a cost-
effective manner, audience reviews and ratings about a movie. Very
likely the rating from an individual will be influenced by her friends,
and diverse social relations among the individuals can introduce
further complications. This kind of data collection can also be found
in many other applications, including product ratings, political cam-
paigns, smartphone applications or hotel and restaurant reviews. A
key observation is that social interactions among users are ubiq-
uitous in many settings in our everyday life. Often times users
are strategic and are not bound to truthfully share their personal
opinions with the data collector. Furthermore, they can even opt
out from data collection and report nothing. Nevertheless, the data
collector can utilize a payment mechanism to incentivize participa-
tion and reward the users who report informative data. The users
are still not compelled to act truthfully and the data collector is not
equipped with an instrument to directly authenticate their reported
data. We note that social learning has not been studied in the liter-
ature on the design of truthful mechanisms to elicit personal data
from strategic users [1, 7, 13, 26, 32, 33].
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate
the impact of social learning on privacy-preserving data collection.
As expected, social learning among users introduces correlation in
the reported data and significantly complicate the design. We seek
to answer the following key questions: When a user consents to
publish her review, what is the best strategy for her to leverage her
friends’ noisy signals as opposed to her own personal signal in her
reported data? Can the users benefit from social learning, and if yes
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Figure 1: (a) If two users i and j are friends, each of them
gets noisy copies of the other’s signals. Vector Ci is called
user i’s learned group signals and its components are noisy
copies of her friends’ private signals. (b) The data collector
is interested in learning the state W , where W is assumed
to be a binary random variable. Conditioned onW , the pri-
vate signals S1, S2, . . . , SN are independently and identically
distributed, with user i’s private signal Si ∈ {0, 1}. Taking Si
and Ci as inputs, user i generates her reported data Xi .
what is the corresponding desired data reporting strategy? Can the
data collector design incentive mechanisms to take advantage of
social learning? Further, what payment mechanism enables the data
collector to minimize the cost in the presence of social learning?
In this paper, the social learning graph is centered around the
context of learning the underlying stateW . The social learning
among privacy-aware users, which can take place in many forms,
including in face-to-face meetings and over multiple online social
media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), is captured by a social learning
graph (or social graph for brevity). Each vertex of this undirected
social graph corresponds to a user and each edge of this social graph
points to information exchange between two1. It is assumed that the
user population size is large, and the data collector knows only the
degree distribution of the social graph. The data collector attempts
to learn the underlying stateW based on data collection from the
privacy-aware users, by using a payment mechanism to incentivize
user participation. Based on her private signal Si and noisy copies
of her friends’ signals Ci j ’s (when i and j are friends), each user i
1The same analysis can be carried out for directed graph models. In Section 5.3,
simulations are provided for both directed and undirected real world networks.
reports data Xi , which may incur privacy leakage. As a result, each
user can either choose to report data or not to participate. Figure 1
depicts an illustration of the information flow in this market model.
1.2 Challenges
We develop a Bayesian game theoretic framework to study the im-
pact of social learning on users’ data reporting strategies and devise
the payment mechanism for the data collector. We assume that the
users are rational, risk-neutral and self-interested. In this study, we
use “type" to denote the private signal and learned group signals
of each user i . Using a variant of the peer-prediction method2, the
data collector scores the reported data of user i by comparing it to
his estimate of the underlying stateW , which is computed based
on the reported data of all other users. The evaluation of this scor-
ing function requires the computation of the estimation accuracy,
which is highly nontrivial because it depends on all the collected
data and hence on user types, which are correlated given the un-
derlying state due to social learning. Further, in the existence of
social learning, the quality of the reports can vary across the users,
because different users have different numbers of friends and each
user is capable of claiming the control of her privacy level against
the data collector. Indeed, the user heterogeneity poses significant
challenges to characterize the optimal data reporting strategy and
the desired payment mechanism.
It is worth noting that the data reporting strategies developed
under this market model, would result in negligible privacy leakage
of friends’ signals, as elaborated as follows.
• As it will be discussed in Section 4, the best response data
reporting strategies under the desired payment mechanism
are based on the majority voting in which each user locally
estimates the underlying state from the sum of the group
signal. Given i and j are friends, it can happen only in the
worst case scenario for user i that an attacker obtains user
i’s (noisy) signal by observing j’s action: The attacker knows
every signal j receives from her friends except i and there is
a tie between the number of 1s and 0s in this set.
• Any attack attempt which targets to learn a user’s private
signal from her friends’ reported data would require the
exact knowledge of social learning graph, which we assume
not available. Furthermore, users learn only noisy versions
of their friends’ signals, where the noise is used to model
privacy protection against social learning.
• In the model under consideration, each user receives di sig-
nals from her friends and reports either ‘1’ or ‘0’. Conse-
quently, this implies that the privacy leakage through the
reported data, which is a mapping from the {0, 1}di+1 space
to {0, 1}, is minimal in general.
Alternatively, one can develop utility functions accounting for the
privacy loss of friends’ signals. We will study this in future work.
1.3 Relevant Work
Market models where privacy-aware strategic users treat their data
as a commodity have recently received much interest [7, 11, 13, 14,
26, 32, 33]. In all these studies, the users are regarded as individual
2See [10] for a recent and extensive survey of this field.
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Figure 2: Strategy profile at Bayesian Nash Equilibria: The
data reporting strategy at BNE is in the form of either a non-
disclosive strategy or a symmetric randomization strategy.
Using Fi , defined as the sum of the social group signals, each
user (with degree di ) determines which strategy to follow.
agents but social learning among them is not accounted for. The
market model proposed in [33] can be differentiated in this stream
of work where each user directly controls the privacy level of her
reported data. Our proposed model can be regarded as a general-
ization of the model in [33] which assumes that the knowledge of
each user is limited to its private signal. User heterogeneity in peer
prediction has recently gained attention, but there are very few
results on handling its complication [1, 29]. Further, little attention
has been paid to the cases where the reported data is correlated
across users given the true state. We shall study both these two
issues in the market model in this paper.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the users have richer information
about the underlying state beyond their private signals, thanks to
the presence of social learning, and can therefore use this additional
information to conceive their reporting strategy which can poten-
tially have significant impact on the data collection. In fact, each
user becomes more knowledgeable through social learning and can
act as a local data curator. Furthermore, we revisit the notion of
informative strategy in the framework of data privacy games where
the users report their data using randomized response strategies to
achieve privacy protection. We show that, in the presence of social
learning, this conventional notion of “informative strategy" would
not encompass some desired equilibria where each user reports
informative data based on her friends’ signals only. Building on
this new insight, we introduce informative non-disclosive strate-
gies which allows a user to formulate strategies based on only her
learned group signals if there is strong concurrence. This is one of
main findings in this study.
We caution that social learning does not create situations akin to
herding [2] or information cascades [4]. In our market model, the
users take their actions in parallel, not sequentially, and the reported
data in this study, are only revealed to the data collector not to the
other participants. Further, in the model, friends do not collude or
collaborate when formulating their data reporting strategies based
on their private signals and group signals.
1.4 Summary of Main Results
Our findings reveal that, in general, the data reporting strategies
at the Bayesian-Nash equilibria (BNE) can be in the form of either
symmetric randomized response (SR) strategy or non-disclosive
(ND) strategy (which are formally defined in Section 3), and vary
from user to user. Intuitively, when a user plays the ND strategy,
her reported data is completely based on her learned group signals,
independent of her private signal. More specifically, under the
condition that the social learning graph is sparse3, we show that the
ND strategy is a desired data reporting strategy at Bayesian Nash
equilibria, particularly when her group signals are more reliable, i.e.,
the signals learned from her friends are less noisy. Intuitively, albeit
having a signal different from the majority of her friends’ signals,
a user might be better off to pretend in accordance with them.
Further, the users’ reported data along this line is still informative
for the data collector. Our main contributions can be summarized
as follows.
• We formalize non-disclosive (ND) strategies where the re-
ported data by a user completely depends on her noisy social
group signals, independent of her private signal. There are
many cases the informative ND strategy is preferred over the
symmetric randomized response strategy. Further, both the
data collector and the users can benefit from social learning
which drives down the privacy costs and helps to improve
the state estimation. The underlying rationale is as follows:
Thanks to social learning, each individual user has richer
information about the underlying state and hence has more
options for data reporting. In particular, some users’ privacy
cost can be driven to zero when ND strategies are used. This,
in turn, benefits the data collector and drives down the over-
all cost, since his data resources are more informed and can
report informative data at lower privacy costs.
• The data reporting strategy at the BNE is in the form of
either an ND strategy or an SR strategy. As illustrated in
Figure 2, a majority voting based data reporting rule is ap-
plied by each user to her learned group signals to determine
which strategy to follow. Since each user has different social
ties, the BNE strategy varies from user to user. In the spe-
cial case with noiseless group signals, the user employs the
ND strategy in which each user reports the majority of her
friends’ signals, for data reporting, unless there is a tie. In
general, the group signals are noisy, and hence the ND strat-
egy requires a ’higher’ majority than that in the noiseless
case, and otherwise the user would follow the SR strategy.
The regime change hinges heavily on the noise levels of her
group signals and the privacy requirements.
• The objective of the data collector is to estimate the under-
lying stateW from the users’ reported data. To tackle the
technical difficulty that the reported data is correlated across
users given the underlying state, we use a Central Limit The-
orem for dependence graphs to characterize the statistics of
the reported data profile, based on which the data collector
can evaluate the estimation error ofW . The total expected
payment is then characterized for a given accuracy target.
Our analysis pinpoints to the positive impact of social learn-
ing on the privacy-preserving data collection game, in the
sense that the data collector can lower the total payment
significantly (compared to the case with no learning) and
the users incur less privacy costs, thanks to social learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the
models for the privacy-preserving data collection market and the
social learning graph in Section 2. We formalize the Bayesian game
3The average number of friends users have is much smaller than the total number of
users.
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Figure 3: The parameter θ1, defined as θ1=θ0(1−α) + (1−θ0)α ,
measures the quality of the group signal.
under this market model in Section 3. We present the main results
on the data reporting strategies and the payment mechanism design
in Section 4. We discuss the impact of social learning on the pay-
ment and accuracy in Section 5. Finally, we summarize and discuss
possible extensions and open problems in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Private Signal and Group Signals
Consider a market model where the data collector is interested in
learning the underlying stateW from a set I = {1, 2, . . . ,N } of
N ≥ 2 users. For ease of exposition,W is assumed to be a binary
random variable, for example, representing the product quality as
good or bad 4. We assume that both PW (1) and PW (0) are positive
and PW (·) is common knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 1, each
user i possesses a binary signal Si , which is her personal data,
representing her knowledge aboutW . The private signal profile
of the entire population is denoted as S = [S1 S2 · · · SN ]. Given
W , it is assumed that the binary signals Si ’s are independent and
identically distributed. Note that the parameter θ0 with 0.5 < θ0 < 1
determines the quality of the private signals for every user:
P(Si = 1|W = 1) = θ0, P(Si = 0|W = 1) = 1 − θ0, (1a)
P(Si = 0|W = 0) = θ0, P(Si = 1|W = 0) = 1 − θ0. (1b)
The social learning graph G = {I, E} is used to model t he social
coupling among the users. The vertex set is the set of individuals
I and the edge set is given as E = {(i, j) ∈ I × I : ei j = 1}
where ei j = 1 if and only if there is a social tie between i and j
where i , j . (Similar studies can be carried out for the direct graph
model.) User i’s social group Gi is defined as the set of her friends:
Gi = {j ∈ I : ei j = 1}. The number of friends i has is called the
degree Di of that user. We assume that the social graph is a random
graph5 with node degrees following a distribution ρd with maximal
degree Dmax [24], and that the social graph is sparse satisfying the
following conditions [34].
Assumption 1. Maximal degreeDmax = o(N 1/4) and E[D2+△]<∞
for some △ > 0.
4Binary feedback and review systems are prevalent, e.g. Netflix recently decided to
swap out five star rating system for a binary system [8]. On many platforms, it is
observed that the vast majority of ratings are either the best or the worst option
[12, 16, 35].
5We follow the configuration model described in [24]. The degrees {di }Ni=1 are inde-
pendent and identically distributed random integers drawn from ρd . Pairs of users
are chosen at random and edges are formed between them until complete pairing
according to the drawn degree sequence. If complete pairing is not possible, one di
can always be discarded and redrawn from ρd .
Data Collector
Users
Data Collector
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Privacy - 
Preserved 
User Reports
Payments from 
the Data 
Collector
(a) (b)
Figure 4: A Market Model: a) Each user plays a Bayesian
Game to report her privacy-preserved data to data collec-
tor; b) Data collector determines the amount of reward for
each user based on the entire reported data profile X =
[X1 . . .XN ].
The degree distribution ρd is common knowledge for the data
collector and the users. However, the data collector does not have
any further knowledge about the social graph G. The users know
who their friends are, but they do not possess any knowledge about
their friends’ social groups, i.e., they do not know howmany friends
of their friends have and who they are.
Each user i has noisy copies of her friends’ personal signals. For
user i with social group Gi , let vector Ci denote her group signals:
Ci = [Ci j1Ci j2 . . .Ci jdi ], where Ci j ’s are binary valued. To capture
the noise in social learning of group signals, it is assumed that
friends’ personal signals are “flipped” with crossover probability α :
P(Ci j =1|Sj =0) = P(Ci j =0|Sj =1) = α , 0 ≤ α < 0.5. Consequently,
the parameter θ1 = θ0(1−α)+ (1−θ0)α points to the quality of group
signals:
P(Ci j = 1|W = 1) = θ1, P(Ci j = 0|W = 1) = 1 − θ1, (2a)
P(Ci j = 0|W = 0) = θ1, P(Ci j = 1|W = 0) = 1 − θ1. (2b)
Note that these “flips" are statistically independent with a proba-
bility of α , i.e. given j1 and j2 are friends with i , P(Cj1i = si |Cj2i =
c j2i , Si = si ) = P(Cj1i = c j1i |Si = si ) = 1 − α .
2.2 Users’ Data Reporting Strategies and Data
Collector’s Payment Mechanism
Following the convention in the Bayesian games [15], we define
type ti as ti = [si ci ]. Respectively, the type space T can be defined
as T = ∪Dmaxk=0 Tk where Tk = {0, 1}k+1. The type profile t is defined
as t = {t1, t2, . . . , tN }. Each user i knows her own type vector ti
but lacks the knowledge of other users’ type vectors, defined as
t−i 6.
The reported data of user i is denoted with Xi . It follows that
X = [X1 X2 . . . XN ] is the reported data profile, where Xi ∈ X =
{0, 1,⊥} and ⊥ represents “non-participation". Let σi (ti ) ∈ △(X)
denote the action user i chooses when her type is ti , where △(X)
being the set of all probability distributions over X. The strategy of
user i , defined as σi = {σi (ti ) : ti ∈ T }, specifies the probabilities
Pσi (Xi ∈ F |Ti =ti ) for all F ⊆ X. The strategy profile σ is defined
as σ = {σ1,σ2, . . . ,σN }. A strategy profile σ is called symmetric if
6For a given type profile t, define tA = [ta1 . . . taK ]whereA = {a1, . . . , aK } ⊂ I.
The set of all users other than user i is denoted by "−i".
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we have:
σ1(t) = σ2(t) = · · · = σN (t), ∀t ∈ T . (3)
For a given type profile t = {t1, t2, . . . , tN }, σ (t) denotes the collec-
tion σ (t) = {σ1(t1),σ2(t2), . . . ,σN (tN )}.
When i and j are friends, Ci j , a noisy version of j’s personal
signal, is a component ofTi (andCji is a component ofTj ). Further,
if i and j are not friends but they have a common friend ℓ, then
both i and j have noisy copies of Sℓ in their type vectors. To sum
up, Xi and X j can be correlated givenW if user i and j are friends
or they have a common friend, because the user strategies depend
on the user types. If user i and j are not friends or they do not have
a common friend, then Xi and X j are conditionally independent
given the underlying stateW .
The primary goal of the data collector is to estimate the un-
derlying stateW from users’ reported data X1,X2, . . . ,XN . Intu-
itively, for the data collector’s perspective, a desired data reporting
strategy produces reported data carrying information about the
underlying stateW . It is assumed that the data collector cannot
impose penalties on the users, in the sense that positive rewards are
the only options at his disposal to incentivize informative report-
ing in the presence of privacy costs as depicted on Fig. 4. Define
the non-negative payment mechanism as R : XN → RN , where
Ri (x) specifies the amount of payment for user i given X = x and
R(x) = [R1(x) R2(x) . . . RN (x)]. Further, the utility of each user
is considered as the difference between her expected reward and
privacy cost.
2.3 Data Privacy Model
Needless to say, the users are subjected to privacy cost д(σi ) when
they carry out data reporting. Based on the celebrated notion of
differential privacy [9], we define the privacy loss inflicted on the
users as the level of local differential privacy when using the strat-
egy σi . Roughly speaking, given her group signal ci , user i’s privacy
cost decreases as her data reporting makes her personal signal si
more indistinguishable.
Definition 1. [Privacy Level] The privacy level of strategy σi ,
for a given Ci =ci , is defined as
ζi (σi , ci )= maxF⊆{0,1,⊥},
si ∈{0,1}
ln
(
Pσi (Xi ∈ F | Ci =ci , Si =si )
Pσi (Xi ∈ F | Ci =ci , Si =1−si )
)
, (4)
where the convention 0/0 = 1 is followed.
To get a more concrete sense, consider an extreme case where
the user’s reported data is her personal signal, Xi =Si given Ci =ci .
In this case, the privacy level ζ (σi , ci ) is equal to∞, the maximum
possible privacy leakage for her. On the contrary, ζ (σi , ci ) is equal
to 0 when the reported data Xi is independent from the personal
signal Si given Ci =ci . This strategy is referred as a non-disclosive
strategy (including non-informative strategy as a subclass) which
incurs the minimum possible privacy leakage for this specific user.
We next introduce the privacy cost function д(ζi (σi , ci )) and the user
utility function. In this work, it is assumed that д is homogeneous
across the users and satisfies the following conditions: It is convex,
continuously differentiable, increasing, nonnegative and д(0) = 0.
Figure 5: Strategy profiles at BNE. (a) Non-Disclosive (ND)
Strategies: Xi is independent from the private signal Si . In
general, Xi is dependent on the group signalCi . (b) Symmet-
ric Randomized Response (SR) Strategies: Si and Xi are the
input and the output of a noisy binary symmetric channel
in which the noise level corresponds to the privacy level of
the user. In general, the privacy level depends on the group
signals Ci .
3 BAYESIAN GAME FORMULATION
The Bayesian Game under this market model is outlined as fol-
lows: The data collector announces a payment mechanism, which
actuates a strategic form game where the users are the players
aiming to maximize their expected utility, which is the difference
between their rewards and their privacy costs. In this game, the
common knowledge includes the prior state distribution PW , the
signal quality parameter θ0, the crossover probability α , the degree
distribution ρd , the privacy cost function д and the payment mech-
anism R. In this game with incomplete information, we focus on
Bayesian-Nash equilibria where each user has no incentive to uni-
laterally change her strategy given other users’ strategies. Formally,
a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) is defined in the following7.
Definition 2 (BNE). A strategy profile σ = [σ1 σ2 . . . σN ] is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if, for each user i ∈ I,
σi ∈ arg max
σ ′i ∈△(X)
E(σ ′i ,σ−i )[Ri (X) − д(ζ (σ
′
i ,Ci ))]. (5)
We show that users’ data reporting strategies at the Bayesian-
Nash equilibria are in the form of either symmetric randomized
responses or non-disclosive strategies. Firstly, we formally define the
non-disclosive strategies as follows.
Definition 3 (ND Strategy). σi ([· ci ]) is called a non-disclosive
(ND) strategy, if Si and Xi are independent given Ci ; that is to say,
for every F ⊆ {0, 1,⊥} and si ∈ {0, 1} we have
Pσi (Xi ∈ F |Si =si ,Ci =ci )=Pσi (Xi ∈ F |Ci =ci ).
When an ND strategy is played by user i , the reported data Xi is
independent from her private signal Si . That is to say, this strategy
does not disclose any private information and essentially sets her
privacy cost to 0, i.e. ζi (σi , ci ) = 0. Notice that, in general, her
reported data still depends on her group signals Ci and is corre-
lated with the underlying stateW . Next we define the symmetric
randomized response, for ξ (ci ) : {0, 1}di → R.
7(σ ′i , σ−i ) denotes the strategy profile {σ1(t1), . . . , σi−1(ti−1), σ ′i (ti ), σi+1(ti+1),
. . . , σN (tN ))} where i plays σ ′i (ti ) and the other user play σ−i (t−i ).
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Definition 4 (SR Strategy). σi ([· ci ]) is called a symmetric ran-
domized response (SR) strategy, if it satisfies the following:
Pσi (Xi =1|Si =1,Ci =ci )=Pσi (Xi =0|Si =0,Ci =ci )=
eξ (ci )
1+eξ (ci )
Pσi (Xi =0|Si =1,Ci =ci )=Pσi (Xi =1|Si =0,Ci =ci )=
1
1+eξ (ci )
Pσi (Xi =⊥|Si =1,Ci =ci ) = Pσi (Xi =⊥|Si =0,Ci =ci ) = 0.
When an SR strategy is played by user i , the privacy level of the
strategy, is determined by the injected noise level on the personal
signal Si , ζi (σi , ci ) = |ξ (ci )|. Note that we are interested in the
regime ξ (ci ) > 0, for the reported data to be useful for the hypothe-
sis testing problem. In general, when an SR strategy is played, both
the private signal Si and the group signal Ci are correlated with
the reported data Xi . We have the following lemma characterizing
the desired strategies of Bayesian-Nash equilibria (the proof can be
found in Appendix A).
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, for any non-negative payment
mechanism, a user’s data reporting strategy σi ([· ci ]) in a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is either a symmetric randomized response strategy
or a non-disclosive strategy.
Note that if a user plays with a strategy where her reported data
Xi is independent from both her private data Si and her group
signal Ci , then Xi is pure noise. As a result, it is uninformative for
the data collector, and it is a degenerated form of the ND strategy.
We remark that Lemma 1 is a generalization of Lemma 1 in [33].
When a user i does not have any friends (Di = 0), ND strategies
reduce to be uninformative. On the other hand, in the presence
of social learning (Di > 0), ND strategies can be informative and
positively contribute to the data collector’s information elicitation.
4 DATA COLLECTOR’S PAYMENT
MECHANISM
The primary objective of the data collector is to estimate the under-
lying stateW from users’ reported data X1,X2, . . . ,XN with the
minimum error probability. The binary hypothesis testing problem
can be stated as
H0 :W = 0, H1 :W = 1. (6)
Clearly, the estimation ofW from users’ reported data X is viable
only if there exists BNE strategies in which X is informative about
W . According to Lemma 1, at the BNE, data reporting strategies
are either in the form of symmetric randomized responses (SR) or
non-disclosive (ND) strategies. In the presence of social learning, in
addition to her private signal, each user obtains noisy group signals
through social interactions. It is plausible to view each user as a
local decision maker who processes the data available to her and
reports it to the data collector who acts as a fusion center. With
this insight, we generalize the notion of informative strategies in
the peer-prediction literature to include the ND strategies, and
then study the payment mechanism design for the data reporting
strategies where each user chooses between SR or ND strategies
based on their group signals Ci .
One main focus of this paper is on designing the payment mech-
anism R under which each user can form her data reporting strate-
gies, and the data collector can accurately estimate the underlying
stateW based on the reported data with minimum error probabil-
ity. In the presence of social learning, the optimal design hinges
heavily upon the user types which are correlated across users for a
givenW and involves combinatorial optimization, and hence is very
challenging, if not impossible, to attain for the general case with
finite N . To tackle this challenge, we will tackle the problem first at
the local level by considering a hypothetical genie-aided payment
mechanism and then study the optimal data reporting strategy in
the asymptotic regime of N (for the sake of tractability). Finally,
we present in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 the desired payment mechanism
using peer prediction and the BNE strategies accordingly.
4.1 Users as Local Data Curators
We first consider a hypothetical scenario where the data collector
has access to the underlying stateW and can employW in a genie-
aided payment mechanism, Rg : XN × {0, 1} → RN , such that
R
g
i ((xi , x−i ),w) = Rg(xi ,w).
Observe that in this scenario the payments users receive do not
depend on reported data of the other users. Furthermore, it is a
symmetric payment mechanism, i.e., Ri (xi ,w) = Rj (x j ,w) if xi =
x j . In this genie-aided scenario the mechanism design problem is
greatly simplified to a decentralized detection problem in which
each user acts as a local decision maker aiming to minimize the
probability of error given her type Ti . The conditional expected
payment of user i at strategy σi is given by
Eσi
[
R
g
i (Xi ,W )|Ti=t
]
=
∑
w,x
Rg(x ,w)P(W =w |Ti =t)Pσi (Xi =x |Ti =t).
Without loss of generality, assume that Rg(0, 0) ≥ Rg(1, 0) and
Rg(1, 1) ≥ Rg(0, 1) , the payment can be maximized if Xi is selected
according to the following decision rule:
Λi (t) = P(Ti = t |W = 1)P(Ti = t |W = 0)
Xi=1
⋛
Xi=0
PW (0)
PW (1)
Rg(0, 0) − Rg(1, 0)
Rg(1, 1) − Rg(0, 1)
where Λi (t) is the likelihood ratio for a given typeTi . Let Rg(1, 0) =
Rg(0, 1) = 0. Further, setting the right-hand side (RHS) of the above
inequality to 1 renders the genie-aided payment mechanism as
follows:
Rg(x ,w) =

Zg/PW (0) if x = w = 0,
Zg/PW (1) if x = w = 1,
0 otherwise
(7)
where Zg > 0 is a design parameter. Under this payment mecha-
nism, user i employs the maximum-likelihood (ML) decision rule
to maximize her conditional expected payment:
Wˆ MLi (si , ci ) = arg max
w ∈{0,1}
P(Si =si ,Ci =ci |W =w),
thereby removing the need of using the prior distribution of PW (w).
The ML rule can be rewritten as∑
j ∈Gi
ci j
Wˆ MLi (si ,ci )=1
⋛
Wˆ MLi (si ,ci )=0
di
2 − (2si − 1)A¯ (8)
with A¯ given by
A¯ =
1
2
log θ0/(1−θ0)
log θ1/(1−θ1) . (9)
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For convenience, denote the sum of the group signals by random
variable Fi and its realization by fi :
Fi =
∑
j ∈Gi
Ci j and fi =
∑
j ∈Gi
ci j .
It follows from (8) that
Wˆ MLi (si , fi ) =

1, if fi > di/2 + A¯,
0, if fi < di/2 − A¯,
si , otherwise.
(10)
It can be seen from (10) that when fi > Di/2+A¯ or fi < Di/2−A¯, the
ML rule reduces to reporting themajority bit of the group signal and
does not involve the private signal Si , thereby incurring no privacy
cost for user i . On the other hand, for the case fi ∈ [di/2−A¯, di/2+A¯],
the ML rule clearly depends on the private signal Si and would
incur privacy cost.
Based on (10), we formally define the majority voting (MV) based
data reporting strategy, denoted by σ ∗i . It is essentially a modified
version of theML rule. Specifically, when user i needs to incorporate
her private signal, Si , into her data reporting strategy; she uses a
noisy version of Si .
Definition 5. The majority voting (MV) based data reporting, σ ∗i
has the following form:
• Pσ ∗i (Xi =1|Si =si ,Ci =ci )
=

1 if fi > di/2+τ1, (ND)
0 if fi < di/2−τ0, (ND)
eξ (fi )
1+eξ (fi ) if fi ∈
[ di
2 −τ0, di2 +τ1
]
, si = 1, (SR)
1
1+eξ (fi ) if fi ∈
[ di
2 −τ0, di2 +τ1
]
, si = 0, (SR)
(11)
• Pσi (Xi =0|Si =si ,Ci =ci ) = 1 − Pσi (Xi =1|Si =si ,Ci =ci ),
where 0 ≤ τ0,τ1 ≤ di/2 and ξ (fi ) ≥ 0.
In the MV based data reporting strategies, the sum of the group
signals, fi ’s, are used. Therefore, with a little abuse of notation,
ζ (σ ∗i , fi ) and ζ (σ ∗i , ci ) are used interchangeably in Section 4. When
fi ∈ [di/2 − τ0, di/2 + τ1], user i employs the SR strategy. In this
case, the privacy level of σ ∗i for fi is ζi (σ ∗i , fi ) = ξ (fi ). When
fi < [di/2−τ0, di/2+τ1], user i employs the ND strategy and the
privacy level of σ ∗i for fi is ζi (σ ∗i , fi ) = 0. The privacy level of the
SR strategy, ξ (fi ), and the thresholds τ0 and τ1, depend on Zg from
(7) and the system model parameters. We will elaborate further
on this in Section 4.4. The majority voting based data reporting
strategy profile is denoted by σ ∗ where σ ∗ = {σ ∗1 ,σ ∗2 , . . . ,σ ∗N }.
The next result states that σ ∗ is a BNE in the genie-aided payment
mechanism Rg. Its proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 1. In the payment mechanism Rg (7), σ ∗ is a BNE.
Up to this point, we focus on the best response strategies of the
users in the genie-aided mechanism, Rg. In the next subsection, we
analyze how the data collector can estimate the underlying state
from users’ reported data X. In Section 4.3, building on the genie-
aided mechanism Rg, we devise a peer-prediction based payment
mechanism R˜ where the data collector obtains the estimate ofW
from the users’ reported data. Finally, in Section 4.4, we present the
exact details of the BNE σ ∗, and in particular, τ0,τ1 and ξ (fi ), are
determined accordingly.
4.2 Data Collector as Fusion Center
Recall that the objective of the data collector is to estimate the
underlying stateW from the users’ reported dataX. The conditional
distributions of the reported data profile X, given the underlying
stateW , are dictated by the user data reporting strategies. For a
given strategy profile σ , we restate the binary hypothesis testing
problem (6) as follows:
H0 : X ∼ Pσ (X = x|W = 0), H1 : X ∼ Pσ (X = x|W = 1).
The data collector employs the maximum a posteriori (MAP) deci-
sion rule, denoted by Wˆσ (x), in order to minimize the probability
of error of the hypothesis testing problem:
Λσ (x) := Pσ (X = x|W = 1)Pσ (X = x|W = 0)
Wˆσ (x)=1
⋛
Wˆσ (x)=0
PW (0)
PW (1) (12)
In general, Xi and X j are correlated givenW , if user i and j are
friends or they have common friends owing to the social learning
among the users. The closed-form evaluation of Λσ (X) is often
intractable for dependent observations. In what follows, we present
two lemmas to study Λσ (x) in the asymptotic regime of N .
Recall that symmetric strategy profiles are defined in (3). The
next result shows that Wˆσ (x) in (12) depends on∑Ni=1 xi when σ is
a symmetric strategy profile.
Lemma 2. For every symmetric strategy profile σ andw ∈ {0, 1},
we have
Pσ (X = x|W = w) = Pσ
(∑N
i=1 Xi =
∑N
i=1 xi |W = w
)
.
The proof is relegated to Appendix C.
Next, we employ a Central Limit Theorem for dependence graphs
[17] to characterize the asymptotic statistics of
∑
i Xi . For any sym-
metric strategy profile σ , we define µw (σ ) as the conditional mean
of Xi givenW = w withw ∈ {0, 1}:
µ1(σ ) := Pσ (Xi =1|W =1); µ0(σ ) := Pσ (Xi =1|W =0). (13)
Recall that Ei j = 1 if there is a social tie between i and j , otherwise
Ei j = 0. Similarly, Bi j = 1 if i and j have a common friend, other-
wise Bi j = 0. For convenience, we define ςw and ς˜w forw ∈ {0, 1},
as follows:
ςw (σ ) := Pσ (Xi =w,X j =w |W =w,Bi j =0, Ei j =1), (14a)
ς˜w (σ ) := Pσ (Xi =w,X j =w |W =w,Bi j =1, Ei j =0), (14b)
In the rest of the paper, for purposes of brevity, we drop the de-
pendency of µw (σ ), ςw (σ ) and ς˜w (σ ) on σ when it is clear from
the context. We have the following result on the asymptotics of∑N
i=1 Xi as N →∞.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, conditioned onW =w , for a sym-
metric data reporting strategy profile σ ,
∑N
i=1 Xi−N µw√
Nκw
converges in
distribution to a standard normal random variable as N →∞, with
κ1(σ ) := µ1 − µ21 + E[D] (ς1 − ς˜1) + E[D2]
(
ς˜1 − µ21
)
, (15a)
κ0(σ ) := µ0(1−µ0)+E[D] (ς0−ς˜0)+E[D2]
(
ς˜0 − (1 − µ0)2
)
. (15b)
The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix D.
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Appealing to Lemmas 2 and 3, for large N , the MAP Decision
rule Wˆσ ∗ (x) can be approximated as follows:
1
κ0
(
µ0−
∑
xi
N
)2
− 1
κ1
(
µ1−
∑
xi
N
)2 Wˆσ ∗ (x)=1
⋛
Wˆσ ∗ (x)=0
2
N
ln
√
κ1
κ0
PW (0)
PW (1) .
4.3 Payment Mechanism Design
Building on the genie-aided mechanism Rg, next we turn our atten-
tion to the design of a peer-prediction based payment mechanism
R˜, where the data collector obtains the estimate ofW from the
users’ reported data. Specifically, in peer prediction each user i’s
reported data Xi is evaluated by using other users’ reported data
X−i ; and each user is rewarded with a payment determined by how
her reported data compares with the other users’ reported data.
In the same spirit, we use majority voting as an effective aggre-
gation method to obtain informative reported data from the users
[22, 28, 31, 33]. By rewarding the users whose reported data is in
agreement with the the other users’ reported data, this payment
mechanism incentivizes the users to participate and report infor-
matively using their private and group signals. More specifically,
we have the following payment mechanism R˜(X):
(1) Each user reports her data, and the data collector counts
the number of participants n excluding the users with “non-
participation".
(2) For non-participating users, the payment is zero. If n = 1,
the data collector pays zero to this participant. Otherwise,
for each participating user i , the data collector computes the
majority of the other participants’ reported data:
M−i =
{ 1 if ∑
j :x j,⊥, j,i
x j ≥
⌊ n−1
2
⌋
+ 1;
0 otherwise.
(3) Compute the payment for user i:
R˜i (1, x−i ) = Z1M−i , (16a)
R˜i (0, x−i ) = Z0(1 −M−i ), (16b)
where Z0 and Z1 are design parameters to be determined by the
data collector.
In the genie-aided scenario, the payment mechanism Rg is de-
signed based on the hypothetical scenario where the underlying
stateW is given. The rationale behind the proposed payment mech-
anism R˜ in (15) above is that the data collector obtains the estimate
ofW from the noisy user reports and utilizes it in the payment
mechanism. Along the same line as in the genie-aided mechanism,
in devising the peer prediction based mechanism R˜, each user first
estimates the underlying stateW based on her type ti . The next
key step lies in the computation of the probability of a user being
consistent with the majority at the BNE strategy profile σ ∗:
βw = Pσ ∗ (M−i = w |W = w), (17)
wherew ∈ {0, 1}. Clearly, when the number of users is large, the
asymptotic statistics of
∑
j X j is the same as the asymptotic statistics
of
∑
j ∈−i X j . Therefore, β0 and β1 can be computed using Lemma 3.
Based on the hypothetical genie-aided payment mechanism Rg
defined in (7), we obtain the design parameters for the payment
mechanism defined in (16) as follows:
Z0 = Z
PW (1)β1 + PW (0)(1 − β0)
(β0+β1 − 1)PW (1)PW (0) , (18a)
Z1 = Z
PW (1)(1 − β1) + PW (0)β0
(β0+β1 − 1)PW (1)PW (0) . (18b)
whereZ > 0 is a design parameter. For the degenerate case in which
the data collector obtains the estimate ofW with no error, we have
that β1 = β0 = 1, indicating that R˜ reduces to the genie-aided
mechanism introduced in (7). Theorem 2 reveals that there exists
a MV based BNE when the data collector employs the payment
mechanism R˜. Its proof is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 2. In the payment mechanism R˜ (18), σ ∗ is a BNE.
It is worth noting that in the payment mechanism R˜, the MV
based BNE equilibrium σ ∗ is not the only equilibrium, as expected.
At σ ∗, no user can gain by playing uninformative when other users
employ the MV rule. However, in R˜, uninformative equilibria also
exist, as it is the case in many peer-prediction and information elici-
tation mechanisms ([27],[23],[18],[30]). One set of such equilibria is
that the users form lying coalitions and collude to report the same
uninformative data 8. However, we caution that the social learning
model does not imply any cooperation and communication among
friends.
4.4 Data Reporting Strategies at BNE
Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a MV based BNE under the
payment mechanism R˜. Recall that, ξ (fi ) corresponds to the privacy
level of σ ∗i when fi ∈ [di/2 − τ0, di/2 + τ1]. To complete the design
of the payment mechanism, it remains to characterize τ0,τ1 and
ξ (fi ) as a function of the mechanism design parameter Z.
For convenience, let ϵ denote the privacy level of σ ∗i when fi =
di/2, ξ (fi ) = ϵ . In the following, we show that, Z can be written in
terms of ϵ as follows:
Z = д′(ϵ) (e
ϵ +1)2
2eϵ (2θ0 − 1) . (19)
The following result formalizes this argument and puts forward an
algorithm to find the BNE strategies.
Proposition 1. The BNE strategy profile σ ∗ can be found by using
Algorithm 1.
For convenience, we define the following functions, which are
used in Algorithm 1:
J ′(η)=eη−ϵ
(
eϵ +1
eη+1
)2 [1+(θ1/(1−θ1))di−2fi ]д′(ϵ)/2
1+pW (0)((θ1/(1−θ1))di−2fi −1)
−д′(η), (20a)
B(η) = (2θ0−1)2eϵ д(η)
д′(ϵ)
(eη+1)
(eϵ +1)2 , (20b)
Aℓ(η) = 2ℓ−1
2 ln
(
θ1
1−θ1
) ln ( eη (1−θ0)+θ0+pW (ℓ)B(η)
eηθ0+1−θ0−pW (1−ℓ)B(η)
)
, (20c)
ϒℓ(η)=

0, if Aℓ(η) ≤ 0
Aℓ(η), if Aℓ(η) ∈ (0, A¯),
A¯, if Aℓ(η) ≥ A¯
for ℓ = 0, 1. (20d)
8Interested readers can find detailed discussions for different colluding scenarios in
the information elicitation mechanism in [19].
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Recall that A¯ is defined in (9). Furthermore, we also define p(si , fi )
and q(si , fi ) as follows:
p(si , fi ) = Pσ ∗i (Xi = 1|Si = si , Fi = fi ), (21a)
q(si , fi ) = Pσ ∗i (Xi = 0|Si = si , Fi = fi ). (21b)
ALGORITHM 1:MV based BNE strategy σ ∗
Input: Type ti , number of friends di .
Output: p(si , fi ) and q(si , fi )
Solve for J ′(η∗) = 0. Set ξ (fi ) = η∗.
if 0 ≤ fi ≤ di/2−ϒ0(ξ (fi )) then p(0, fi ) = p(1, fi ) = 0
and q(0, fi ) = q(1, fi ) = 1 (ND Strategy)
else if fi ≥ di/2+ϒ1(ξ (fi )) then p(0, fi )=p(1, fi )=1
and q(1, fi )=q(0, fi )=0 (ND Strategy)
else p(1, fi )=q(0, fi )=eξ (fi )/(1 + eξ (fi )) and
p0,fi =q1,fi =1/(1 + eξ (fi )) (SR Strategy))
.
The proof of proposition 1 can be found in Appendix F. Simply
put, Algorithm 1 presents a majority rule for a user to determine
σ ∗i : User i needs to compare the expected utilities of playing the ND
and the SR strategies in order to decide upon between them. She
first computes the optimal privacy level for the SR strategy, namely
ξ (fi ), by solving J ′(η∗)=0 and setting ξ (fi ) = η∗. Then, she plays
the SR strategy with ξ (fi ) if di/2− ϒ0(ξ (fi )) ≤ fi ≤ di/2+ ϒ1(ξ (fi ));
otherwise, she plays the ND strategy.
There is a discrepancy between the quality of Si and Ci : θ1 <
θ0. Therefore, the required majority in Ci for playing ND heavily
depends on α , the noise level in the group signals. When α =0, a
simple majority in Ci suffices to determine whether to play ND or
SR. As α increases, the accuracy gap between Si and Ci widens;
therefore, the required majority in Ci for playing ND increases.
4.5 A Closer Look at Data Reporting Strategies:
Two Special Cases
In general, it gets very complicated to determine τ0 and τ1 in terms
of ϒ0(ξ (fi )) and ϒ1(ξ (fi )). To get a more concrete sense, in what
follows we study two special cases where the majority rule can be
further simplified.
4.5.1 The Case with Noiseless Group Signals. Our next re-
sult reveals that when α = 0, at the BNE, a simple majority rule
within the group signals can be used by each user to determine
which strategy to use: Ifdi is even, the user plays SR only if fi =di/2
with privacy level ϵ . If di is odd, the user never plays SR.
Corollary 1. For the case with noiseless group signals, the BNE
strategy profile σ ∗ has the following form:
p(si , fi ) =

1 if fi > di/2,
0 if fi < di/2,
si eϵ+1−si
1+eϵ if fi =di/2,
and q(si , fi )=1−p(si , fi ).
4.5.2 The Case with Equal Priors. Our next result reveals
that when pW (1) = pW (0) = 0.5, we have that ξ (fi ) = ϵ , for fi ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,di }. Therefore, we have ϒ1(ϵ) = ϒ0(ϵ) = ϒ(ϵ) as follows:
ϒ(ϵ)=

0, if A ≤ 0
A, if A∈ (0, A¯),
A¯, if A ≥ A¯
A=
ln
(
eϵ [eϵ θ0+1−(2θ0−1)д(ϵ )/д′(ϵ )]+1−θ0
eϵ [eϵ (1−θ0)+1+(2θ0−1)д(ϵ )/д′(ϵ )]+θ0
)
2 ln
(
θ1
1−θ1
) .
Consequently, we have τ (ϵ) = τ1 = τ0 and τ = ϒ(ϵ).
Corollary 2. For the case with equal priors, the optimal SR strat-
egy at the BNE is as follows:
p(si , fi ) =

1 if fi > di/2 + τ (ϵ),
0 if fi < di/2 − τ (ϵ),
si eϵ+1−si
1+eϵ if fi ∈ [di/2 − τ (ϵ), di/2 + τ (ϵ)],
q(si , fi ) = 1 − p(si , fi ).
From Corollary 2, it is clear that the MV based data reporting
strategies depend heavily on α . As α grows, τ also expands which
implies that the user plays the SR strategy more often at the BNE.
For conciseness, in the remainder of this section, we suppress the
explicit dependence of τ on ϵ .
Next we study the computation of β0 and β1 defined in (17),
under equal priors assumption. We first need to define several
terms. Define γ (k ;d,p) and Γ(k, ℓ;d,p) corresponding to a Binomial
distribution with parametersm (number of trials) and n (probability
of success) as follows:
γ (k ;m,n)=
{(d
k
)
nk (1−n)m−k if k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,n},
0 otherwise;
(22a)
Γ(k, ℓ;m,n)=
⌊ℓ⌋∑
i= ⌈k ⌉
γ (i;m,n), (22b)
where ⌈k⌉ := min{m ∈ Z : m ≥ k} and ⌊ℓ⌋ := max{n ∈ Z : n ≤ ℓ}.
Next, we define ν sr(d,τ ) and νnd(d,τ ):
ν sr(d,τ ) := Γ(d/2 − τ , d/2 + τ ;d,θ1), (23a)
νnd(d,τ ) := Γ(⌊d/2 + τ + 1⌋ ,d ;d,θ1). (23b)
Finally, we define ρ˜ as follows:
ρ˜d := P(Di =d |Di > 0)=
{
0, if d=0;
ρd/(1−ρ0), else.
(24)
Note that, ρ˜ is well defined unless ρ0 = 1 which corresponds to
the case there is no social learning among the users. In the rest of
the paper, we use the subscript notation Eρ˜ when we use ρ˜ for the
expectation of the user degrees.
Proposition 2. For the case with equal priors,κw (σ ∗) and µw (σ ∗)
forw ∈ {0, 1} are as follows:
µ1(σ ∗) = 1 − µ0(σ ∗) = E[νnd(D,τ )] + λ(ϵ)E[ν sr(D,τ )], (25)
κ1(σ ∗) = κ0(σ ∗) = µ1 − µ21 + △˜E[D2] + △(E[D2]−E[D]), (26)
where λ, △ and △˜ are defined as
λ(ϵ) := θ0e
ϵ +1−θ0
eϵ +1 , △˜ :=
ρ0
(1−ρ0)2
(
µ21(2−ρ0) − 2µ1λ + ρ0λ2
)
,
△ := θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α) Eρ˜ [(eϵ (1−θ0)+θ0) γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)
+ (θ0eϵ +1−θ0)γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)]/(eϵ + 1).
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The proof of Proposition 2 is relegated to Appendix G.
We can compute βw = Pσ ∗ (M−i = w |W =w), for w ∈ {0, 1}.
Appealing to Lemma 3, we have that
β := β0 = β1 = Φ
(√
N − 1
κ1(σ ∗)
(
µ1(σ ∗) − 12
))
, (27)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
dard normal distribution. Consequently, for the case with equal
priors, the parameters Z0 and Z1 can be found as follows:
Z = Z0 = Z1 =
д′(ϵ)(eϵ +1)2
eϵ (2θ0−1)(2β−1) .
It is clear that β → 1 as N grows and the proposed payment mech-
anism R˜ (16) boils down to the genie-aided payment mechanism
Rg (7).
Our next result determines the expected payment of the proposed
payment mechanism R˜.
Theorem 3. For the case with equal priors, the total expected
payment at the BNE is the following:
N∑
i=1
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)] = Z
(
1 − β + µ1(σ
∗)
2β − 1
)
N .
Its proof is relegated to Appendix H.
5 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL LEARNING
In this section, we analyze the impact of social learning on the trade-
off between payment and accuracy and that between payment and
privacy cost. We also present examples, using social learning graph
models based on synthetic data and/or real-world data, to evaluate
the performance of our proposed mechanisms.
5.1 Payment vs. Accuracy
The data collector aims to minimize the total payment while achiev-
ing a given accuracy target in estimating W . In particular, the
accuracy is measured by the error rate of the MAP detector (12).
Let R(σ ) denote the set of nonnegative payment mechanisms in
which σ is a BNE. Then, the mechanism design problem for the
data collector is given as follows:
min
R∈R(σ )
N∑
i=1
Eσ [Ri (X)], (28)
s.t. Eσ
[
P(Wˆσ (X) ,W )
] ≤ Pe ,
where the maximum allowable error is represented by Pe . It is
known that in general it is difficult to characterize the error rate
in closed-form at a given BNE strategy profile σ . Therefore, we
measure the accuracy based on an information-theoretic metric
which is closely associated to the error rate of the MAP decision
rule as follows [20]:
Eσ
[
P(Wˆσ (X) ,W )
] ≤ e−B(σ ),
where B(σ ) denotes the Bhattacharyya distance [3]
B(σ ) = − ln
∑
x∈XN
√
Pσ (X=x|W =1)Pσ (X=x|W =0).
Thus, the mechanism design problem can be restated as follows:
min
R∈R(σ )
N∑
i=1
Eσ [Ri (X)], s.t. B(σ ) ≥ − lnPe (29)
Let L(Pe ) denote the minimum total payment while satisfying
the error rate constraint Pe . Appealing to Lemma 2 and 3, we can
simplify the expression for B(σ ), for symmetric strategy profiles
by approximating Pσ (X=x|W =w) as a Gaussian distribution for
large N . Thus, B(σ ) can be calculated explicitly as follows [20]:
B(σ ) = N4
(µ1(σ ) − µ0(σ ))2
κ1(σ ) + κ0(σ ) .
5.2 Bounds on Payment
In this subsection, we investigate an interesting case where all users
play the following non-disclosive strategy, denoted σnd:
Pσ nd (Xi =1|Si =si , Fi = fi ) =

1 if fi > di/2,
0 if fi < di/2,
0.5 else;
Pσ nd (Xi =0|Si =si , Fi = fi ) = 1 − Pσ nd (Xi =0|Si =si , Fi = fi ).
If there is a tie within her group signals, the user tosses a fair coin.
It is clear that the above σnd is a specific form of MV based data
reporting strategies with τ1 = τ0 = 0 and ξ (fi ) = 0, and further in
general σnd is suboptimal. Nevertheless, we show below that if
the required estimation accuracy, in terms of Pe , is loose, the total
payment can be driven to be arbitrarily small by using the above
specific ND strategy, thanks to social learning.
It can be shown that the conditional mean of Xi givenW is
µ1
(
σnd
)
= Eρ [Γ(⌊D/2 + 1⌋,D;D,θ1 + 0.5γ (D/2;D,θ1)], (30)
µ0
(
σnd
)
= Eρ [Γ(⌊D/2 + 1⌋,D;D, 1 − θ1 + 0.5γ (D/2;D, 1 − θ1)].
It is clear that µ0
(
σnd
)
= 1 − µ1
(
σnd
)
and µ1
(
σnd
)
> 1/2. Thus,
appealing to Proposition 2, we can find κw (σnd) forw ∈ {0, 1} as
follows:
κw
(
σnd
)
=µ1
(
σnd
)−µ21 (σnd)+△˜ndE[D2]+△nd(E[D2]−E[D]) (31)
where △nd and △˜nd are found as
△˜nd = (µ21 (σnd)(2 − ρ0) − µ1 (σnd) + 0.25)ρ0/(1 − ρ0)2,
△nd= (θ0−θ20 )(0.5−α)Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2⌋;D−1,θ1)+γ (⌈D/2−1⌉;D−1,θ1)].
After some algebra, we can find B(σnd) from (30) and (31) as fol-
lows:
B (σnd) = N8
(
1+E
[
D2
] △˜nd+ (E[D2]−E[D])△nd
(2µ1(σnd) − 1)2
− 14
)−1
.
Based on the above, we have the next result that the data collector
can drive the total payment to be arbitrarily small for a given N ,
provided that Pe ≤ e−B(σND).
Proposition 3. For the case with equal priors, if Pe ≥ e−B(σND),
then we have that L(Pe ) = δN for any δ > 0, indicating that the
total payment can be driven to be arbitrarily small.
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Figure 6: The impact of social learning: synthetic social learning graphs. (a) (b): State estimation accuracy vs. average degree;
(c) privacy cost per user vs. average degree; (d) payment per user vs. privacy cost per user; (e) (f) payment per user vs. state
estimation accuracy.
The proof is relegated to Appendix I.
Remarks: Theorem 3 pinpoints to the positive impact of social
learning for all participants of the privacy-preserving data collec-
tion game. For the data collector, it implies that he can lower the
payment significantly when there are sufficiently many users. From
the perspective of the users, each of them incurs zero privacy cost.
If the error constraint gets tighter, then the data collector can
employ the designed paymentmechanism, R˜. Under the equal priors
assumption, we can find B(σ ∗) from (25) and (26) as follows:
B (σ ∗) = N8
(
1+E
[
D2
] △˜+ (E[D2]−E[D])△
(2µ1(σ ∗) − 1)2 −
1
4
)−1
.
Note that B(σ ∗) ≥ B(σnd) and the data collector reduces the error
rate of the MAP detectorWˆσ ∗ (X) by gathering informative reported
data from the users who play with the SR strategies.
Based on Theorem 3, our next result reveals that, when Pe <
e−B
(
σ nd
)
, the expected payment of the payment mechanism R˜
constitutes an upper bound on L(Pe ).
Proposition 4. For the case with equal priors, whenPe < e−B
(
σ nd
)
,
we have that
L(Pe ) ≤ Z
(
1 − β + µ1(σ
∗)
2β − 1
)
N .
5.3 Numerical Examples
In this section, we use examples to examine the impact of social
learning on the trade-off between payment and accuracy and that
between payment and privacy cost, using social learning graph
models based on synthetic data and/or real-world data.
5.3.1 Synthetic Social Learning Graphs. To illustrate the
impact of different parameters of the social learning graph and
the payment mechanism on the performance, we first consider a
synthetic model for the social learning graph. In the simulations, we
use the Erdos-Renyi random graph model where each social tie is
considered to be present with independent probability E[Di ]/(N −
1). For large N , the degree distribution can be approximated by the
Poisson distribution. We set N = 250 and PW (0) = PW (1) = 0.5
as default values. In the simulations, quadratic cost function is
considered: д(ζ ) = ζ 2.
Fig. 6a and 6b depict the state estimation accuracy, Pσ ∗ (Wˆσ ∗ (X)=
W ), with respect to the average degree of the social learning graph,
E[Di ]. To achieve a given accuracy level for the state estimator,
the data collector needs to gather informative reported data from
users who play the SR strategy, particularly when α is high. In
the mechanism R˜, the payment users receive, when their reported
data matches with the majority of the other users’ reported data,
is an increasing function of ϵ , a parameter determined by the data
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Figure 7: E[R˜i (X)] vs. Pσ ∗ (Wˆσ ∗ (X) =W ). The impact of social
learning: payment per user vs. accuracy.
collector in order to meet the accuracy requirement. The larger ϵ
is, the less noise the reported data would have (albeit the higher
privacy cost), and hence the more accurate the state estimator.
Fig. 6(b) depicts Pσ ∗ (Wˆσ ∗ (X)=W ) for ϵ = 0.5. Compared to Fig. 6(a),
it is clear that the estimation error is significantly reduced.
When the social learning among users strengthens, the privacy
cost decreases because they receive informative social group signals
Ci more often and hence they play the SR strategy less often. As
illustrated in Fig. 6(c) and 6(d), when the number of friends of
a user increases, it is more likely for this user to play the ND
strategy and hence her privacy cost drops. Accordingly, the total
payment decreases. Furthermore, at the BNE strategy profile σ ∗,
Fig. 6(e) and 6f depict the average payment each user receives in
the payment mechanism R˜ with respect to the state estimation
accuracy, Pσ ∗ (Wˆσ ∗ (X)=W ). It corroborates that the data collector
can get an accurate estimate of the underlying state, with a much
smaller payment compared to the case with no social learning.
5.3.2 Real World Social Learning Graphs. To evaluate the
impact of social learning in practice, we also use two social learn-
ing graph models based on real-world data. Firstly, we study Arxiv
GR-QC (General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology) collaboration
network [21]. The graph contains an edge between authors i and j
if they co-authored at least one paper. The graph has 5242 nodes
and 14496 edges. Secondly, we use the Gnutella peer-to-peer file
sharing network from August 2002 [21]. Nodes represent hosts in
the file sharing network and edges represent connections between
the Gnutella hosts. It has 6301 nodes and 20777 edges. Fig 7 depicts
the state estimation accuracy with respect to the payment per user
under the proposed payment mechanism R˜. These simulation stud-
ies also corroborate that the data collector can obtain an accurate
estimate ofW , with small amounts of payments despite the fact that
very high noise is injected into group signals and private signals.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we study a market model in which users can learn
noisy versions of their social friends’ data and make strategic deci-
sions to report privacy-preserved versions of their personal data to
a data collector. Thanks to the existence of social learning, the users
have richer information about the underlying state beyond their
personal signals. We develop a Bayesian game theoretic framework
to study the impact of social learning on users’ data reporting strate-
gies and devise the payment mechanism for the data collector. Our
findings reveal that, in general, the desired data reporting strategy
at the Bayesian-Nash equilibria can be in the form of either sym-
metric randomized response or informative non-disclosive strategy.
In particular, when a user plays the non-disclosive strategy, she
reports her data completely based on her social group signals, inde-
pendent of her personal signal, which drives her privacy cost to 0.
As a result, both the data collector and the users benefit from social
learning which lowers the privacy costs and helps to improve the
state estimation at a given payment budget.
More specifically, our findings reveal that the desired data re-
porting strategy at the BNE is in the form of either a non-disclosive
strategy or a symmetric randomized strategy. We show that the
desired data reporting strategy is a majority voting based data re-
porting rule which is applied by each user to her group signals
to determine which strategy to follow. It is worth noting that the
payment mechanism is designed to achieve informative equilibria,
because no user can gain by playing uninformative when other
users follow informative data reporting strategies. We caution that
the social learning model does not imply any collusion among
friends. We use a Central Limit Theorem for dependence graphs
to evaluate the estimation error of the underlying state. The to-
tal expected payment is characterized subject to a constraint on
the estimation error. Our analysis reveals both the data collector
and users benefit from social learning: The data collector can get
an accurate estimate of the underlying state, with a much smaller
payment (compared to the case with no learning), thanks to social
learning.
We are currently generalizing this study to account for the opin-
ion formation dynamics which is based on the fusion of private
signals and group signals across heterogeneous users, e.g., diffu-
sion models with influential and stubborn users. It is also of great
interest to investigate the impact of “fake signals” (from fake news),
and our effort along this line is underway.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Recall that Ti = [Si Ci ] is the type of user i and the type profile
is T = [T1 T2 . . . TN ]. Suppose that user i uses strategy σ ′i when
other users follow σ˜−i . For convenience, defineUi ((σ ′i , σ˜−i ), ci ) as
follows:
Ui ((σ ′i , σ˜−i ), ci ) = E(σ ′i , σ˜−i )
[
Ri (X) − д
(
ζ (σ ′i ,Ci )
) |Ci =ci ] .
The expected utilityUi (σ ′i , σ˜−i ) can be written as:
Ui (σ ′i , σ˜−i ) =
∞∑
d=0
ρdi
∑
ci ∈{0,1}di
P(Ci =ci |Di =di )Ui ((σ ′i , σ˜−i ), ci ).
Then, we have that
Ui ((σ ′i , σ˜−i ), ci ) =∑
xi ,si ,t−i
P(Si =si |Ci =ci )Pσ ′i (Xi =xi |Ti =ti )P(T−i = t−i |Ti =ti )
×
(
Eσ˜−i
[
Ri (xi ,X−i )
Ti =ti ,T−i = t−i ]−д(ζ (σ ′i , ci ))) .
For convenience, define p(si , ci ) and q(si , ci ) as follows:
p(si , ci ) = Pσ ′i (Xi =1|Si =si ,Ci =ci ), (32a)
q(si , ci ) = Pσ ′i (Xi =0|Si =si ,Ci =ci ). (32b)
Based on Definition 1, we have that
ζ (σ ′i , ci )=max
{ ln (p(1, ci )p(0, ci )
) , ln ( 1−p(1, ci )1−p(0, ci )
) , ln ( 1−q(1, ci )q(0, ci )
) ,ln (q(1, ci )q(0, ci )
),ln (p(1, ci )+q(1, ci )q(0, ci )+p(0, ci )
) , ln ( 1−p(1, ci )+q(1, ci )1−q(0, ci )+p(0, ci )
) }.
For notation consistency, we use д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci ),q(1, ci ),q(0, ci ))
to denote the privacy cost. It follows that
Ui ((σ ′i ,σ˜−i ), ci )=p(1, ci )K(1, ci ) + p(0, ci )K(0, ci ) + q(1, ci )L(1, ci )
+ q(0, ci )L(0, ci ) − д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci ),q(1, ci ),q(0, ci )),
where K(si , ci ) and L(si , ci ) are given by
K(si , ci ) =
∑
t−i
P(Si =si |Ci =ci ) P(T−i = t−i |Ti =ti )
× Eσ˜−i
(
Ri (1,X−i )|Ti =ti ,T−i = t−i
)
,
L(si , ci ) =
∑
t−i
P(Si =si |Ci =ci )P(T−i = t−i |Ti =ti )
× Eσ˜−i
(
Ri (0,X−i )|Ti =ti ,T−i = t−i
)
.
For any non-negative payment mechanism, K(si , ci ),L(si , ci ) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, for any ci ∈ {0, 1}di , we have K(1, ci ) and K(0, ci )
are either both equal to zero or both positive. Similarly, for a given
ci ∈ {0, 1}di , L(1, ci ) and L(0, ci ) are either both equal to zero or
both positive.WhenK(si , ci ) = 0 and L(si , ci ) > 0, the best response
of user i is to play ND and always report Xi =0. When L(si , ci )=0
and K(si , ci ) > 0, then the best response of user i is to play ND and
always report Xi = 1. When L(si , ci )=K(si , ci )= 0, the expected
reward of the user is 0 and she can follow any ND strategy.
For positive K(si , ci ),L(si , ci ) functions, determining the best
response strategy σ ′i reduces to the following optimization prob-
lem:
max
p(1,ci ),p(0,ci ),
q(1,ci ),q(0,ci )
Ui ((σ ′i , σ˜−i ), ci )
s.t. 0 ≤ p(1, ci ) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q(1, ci ) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p(1, ci ) + q(1, ci ) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p(0, ci ) ≤ 1, 0 < q(0, ci ) < 1,
0 ≤ p(0, ci ) + q(0, ci ) ≤ 1,
0 < p(1, ci ) + q(1, ci ) + p(0, ci ) + q(0, ci ).
This optimization problem has the same form of problem (P)
in [33]. Based on [33], the solution of this optimization problem,
p∗(si , ci ),q∗(si , ci ), must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) p∗(1, ci ) + q∗(1, ci ) = p∗(0, ci ) + q∗(0, ci ) = 1
(2) If p∗(1, ci ) + p∗(0, ci ) , 1, then p∗(1, ci ) = p∗(0, ci ).
It follows that if the optimal action is not playing a symmetric
randomization strategy (p∗(1, ci ) = q∗(0, ci )), then it is playing a
non-disclosive strategy (p∗(1, ci ) = p∗(0, ci )).
B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider the payment mechanism defined in (7). Observe that the
expected utility of user i at strategy σ ′i is independent from the
strategies of the rest of the users:
Ui (σ ′i ,σ ∗−i ) = Eσ ′i [R
g
i (Xi ,W ) − д(ζ (σ ′i ,Ci ))].
Thus,Ui (σ ′i ,σ ∗−i ) = Ui (σ ′i ). Define,Ui (σ ′i , ci ) as follows:
Ui (σ ′i , ci ) = Eσ ′i [R
g
i (Xi ,W ) − д(ζ (σ ′i ,Ci ))|Ci =ci ].
Note that, we have
Ui (σ ′i ) =
∞∑
d=0
ρdi
∑
ci ∈{0,1}di
P(Ci =ci |Di =di )Ui (σ ′i , ci ).
Next, we writeUi (σ ′i , ci ) as follows:
Ui (σ ′i , ci ) =
1∑
si=0
P(Si = si |Ci = ci )
1∑
xi=0
Pσ ′i (Xi =xi |Ti =ti )
×
1∑
w=0
PW (w |Ti =ti )[Rgi (xi ,w)−д(ζ (σ ′i , ci ))],
where we used the facts that Di andW are independent, Si and Ci
are conditionally independent given Di andW , and that Xi andW
are independent given Ti under strategy σ ′i .
Recall that p(si , ci ) and q(si , ci ) are defined in (32). Following the
rationale in the proof of Lemma 1, we have that
Ui (σ ′i , ci ) =
1∑
si=0
p(si , ci )K(si , ci ) + q(si , ci )L(si , ci )
− д (p(1, ci ),p(0, ci ),q(1, ci ),q(0, ci ),
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where K(si , ci ) and L(si , ci ) are defined as
K(si , ci ) = P(Si =si |Ci =ci )
1∑
w=0
PW (w |Ti =ti ) Rgi (1,w),
L(si , ci ) = P(Si =si |Ci =ci )
1∑
w=0
PW (w |Ti =ti ) Rgi (0,w).
From (7), we have that
K(si , ci ) = ZgP(Si =si |Ci =ci )PW (1|Ti =ti )/PW (1),
L(si , ci ) = ZgP(Si =si |Ci =ci )PW (0|Ti =ti )/PW (0).
Observe that K(si , ci ) and L(si , ci ) are positive for every si and ci .
Therefore, by the proof of Lemma 1, non-participation decision
cannot be the best response and hence p(si , ci ) + q(si , ci ) = 1. The
privacy level depends solely on p(1, ci ) and p(0, ci ) and the privacy
level corresponding to strategy σ ′i (ti ) can be written as:
ζ (σ ′i , ci ) = max
{ ln (p(1, ci )p(0, ci )
) , ln ( 1−p(1, ci )1−p(0, ci )
) }.
For brevity, we denote the cost function as д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci )). Then,
Ui (σ ′i , ci ) = p(1, ci )K(1, ci ) + p(0, ci )K(0, ci )
+ K(ci ) − д
(
p(1, ci ),p(0, ci )
)
where
K(si , ci )=K(si , ci )−L(si , ci ), K(ci )=L(1, ci ) + L(0, ci ).
Recall that fi denotes the sum signal fi =
∑
j ∈Gi ci j . For conve-
nience, define Y0 and Y1 as
Y1 := θ
fi
1 (1 − θ1)di−fi , Y0 := θ
di−fi
1 (1 − θ1)fi .
After some algebra, we can write K(si , ci ) and K(ci ) as follows:
K(1, ci ) = Zg θ0Y1 − (1 − θ0)Y0PW (1)Y1 + PW (0)Y0 , (33a)
K(0, ci ) = Zg (1 − θ0)Y1 − θ0Y0PW (1)Y1 + PW (0)Y0 , (33b)
K(ci ) = Zg Y0PW (1)Y1 + PW (0)Y0 . (33c)
Note that, K(si , ci ) and K(ci ) can also be written as K(si , fi ) and
K(fi ). Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we use this notation. By
Lemma 1, it suffices to consider SR and ND strategies:
(I) Symmetric Randomized Response: The strategy is in the form
ofp(1, fi )+p(0, fi ) = 1. Note that, an SR strategy can also be written
as
p(1, fi ) = e
ξ (fi )
1 + eξ (fi )
, p(0, fi ) = 11 + eξ (fi ) .
Then the expected utility can be written as Ui (σ ′i , fi ) = J [ξ (fi )]
where
J [ξ (ci )] := K(1, fi ) e
ξ (fi )
1+eξ (fi )
+ K(0, fi ) 11+eξ (fi ) + K(fi )−д(|ξ (ci )|).
The optimal privacy level as a function of fi can be found by solving
η∗ = arg max
η≥0
J (η),
and setting ξ (fi ) = η∗. Observe that K(1, fi ) > K(0, fi ) as θ0 > 0.5;
therefore, η∗ is always non-negative. For any η ≥ 0,
J ′(η) =
(
K(1, fi ) − K(0, fi )
) eη
(eη + 1)2 − д
′(η)
J ′′(η) = −
(
K(1, fi ) − K(0, fi )
) eη (eη − 1)
(eη + 1)3 − д
′′(η)
By the convexity of д, J ′′(η) ≤ 0 for any η ≥ 0. Therefore, η∗ can
be found by solving the first order condition J ′(φ)=0.
(II) Non-disclosive Strategy: p(1, fi ) = p(0, fi ). Simplify the nota-
tion since p(fi )=p(1, fi )=p(0, fi ). Define J˜ [p(fi )] as
J˜ [p(fi )] = p(K(1, fi ) + K(0, fi )) + K(fi ).
Then, we can find the optimal p(fi ) as
φ∗(fi ) = sgn(K(1, fi ) + K(0, fi )) + 12 ,
and setting p(fi ) = φ∗.
The sum of the group signal fi determines whether user i plays
with the SR strategy or the ND strategy. Define h(fi ) as follows:
h(fi ) = J [η∗] − J˜ [φ∗].
User i employs the SR strategy if J [η∗] > J˜ [φ∗] and employs the
ND strategy if J [η∗] < J˜ [φ∗]:
p(si , fi ) =
{
φ∗ if h(fi ) < 0 (ND)
eη
∗/(1+eη∗ ) if h(fi ) > 0 (SR)
(34)
If h(fi ) = 0, then the user can randomly decide whether she plays
with SR or ND.
First, we consider the case fi =di/2. For the ND strategy, we have
p(di/2) = φ∗ = 0.5 and J˜ [0.5] = K(di/2).
For the SR strategy, if there exists some ϵ > 0 such that
Zg =
д′(ϵ)
2
1
2θ0−1
(eϵ + 1)2
eϵ
,
then
ξ (di/2) = η∗ = ϵ and J (ϵ) = д
′(ϵ)(e2ϵ − 1)
2eϵ + K(di/2).
This implies h(di/2) > 0 and the user plays SR. If there does not
exist such an ϵ > 0, then ξ (di/2) = η∗ = 0 and J (0) = K(di/2). In
this case, h(di/2) = 0; hence the user can toss a fair coin to decide
whether she plays with SR or ND.
When fi , di/2, we have that
h(fi )=

K(1, fi ) eξ (fi )1+eξ (fi ) +K(0, fi )
1
1+eξ (fi ) −д(ξ (fi )) if fi <di/2,
−K(1, fi ) 11+eξ (fi ) −K(0, fi )
eξ (fi )
1+eξ (fi ) −д(ξ (fi )) if fi >di/2.
Recall that A¯ is defined in (9). If fi ≥ di/2+A, thenK(0, fi ),K(1, fi ) ≥
0; and hence the ND strategy with p(fi ) = 1 is the best response.
Similarly, if fi ≤ di/2 − A, then K(0, fi ),K(1, fi ) ≤ 0; and hence
the ND strategy with p(fi )=0 is the best response. Note that, both
K(1, fi ) and K(0, fi ) are monotonic functions and non-decreasing
in fi . Then, there exist τ0,τ1 < di/2 such that
sgn(h(fi )) =

−1 if fi < di/2−τ0
−1 if fi > di/2+τ1
1 else.
(35)
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C PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Recall that E is the adjacency matrix of the social graph G. Let ®Ei
denote the ith row of the adjacency matrix E: ®Ei = [Ei1 . . . EiN ].
Recall that S is the signal profile S = [S1 S2 . . . SN ] and X is the
reported data profile X = [X1 X2 . . .XN ]. Conditioned onW , the
joint distribution of X can be written as
Pσ (X=x|W =w) =
∑
s∈{0,1}N
P(S=s|W =w) Pσ (X=x|S=s).
Recall that we consider the configuration model described in [24]
for the social graph G. The degrees D = [D1 D2 . . .DN ] are inde-
pendent and identically distributed random integers drawn from
ρd . Pairs of users are chosen at random and edges are formed be-
tween them until complete pairing according to the drawn degree
sequence. If complete pairing is not possible, one di can always
be discarded and redrawn from ρd . This procedure generates ev-
ery possible adjacency matrix E with the given degree sequence
d = [d1 d2 . . .dN ] with equal probability. GivenW , Si ’s are inde-
pendent and identically distributed with the quality parameter θ0.
Thus, it follows that E and S are independent.
Define SN as the set of all symmetric and binary matrices in
which the entries of themain diagonals are all zeros. The conditional
distribution of X given S can be written as
Pσ (X=x|S=s) =
∑
e∈SN
Pσ (X=x|S=s, E=e)P(E=e|S=s)
=
∑
e∈SN
Pσ (X=x|S=s, E=e)P(E=e).
Recall that, given user typeTi = ti , the statistics ofXi is determined
by the user strategy σi (ti ). Therefore, given the type profile T =
[T1 T2 . . .TN ], X1, . . . ,XN are conditionally independent. Thus,
Pσ (X=x|S=s, E=e)
=
∑
t∈TN
P(T= t|S=s, E=e)Pσ (X=x|S=s, E=e,T= t),
=
∑
t∈TN
N∏
i=1
P(Ti =ti |S=s, E=e) Pσ (Xi =xi |S=s, E=e,T= t),
=
∑
t∈TN
∏
i
P(Ti =ti |S=s, ®Ei = ®ei ) Pσ (Xi =xi |S=s, ®Ei = ®ei ,Ti =ti ),
=
∑
t∈TN
∏
i
Pσ (Xi = xi ,Ti = ti |S = s, ®Ei = ®ei ),
=
∑
t1∈T
· · ·
∑
tN ∈T
∏
i
Pσ (Xi = xi ,Ti = ti |S = s, ®Ei = ®ei ),
=
∑
t1∈T
Pσ (X1=x1,T1=t1 |S=s, ®E1= ®e1) . . .∑
tN ∈T
Pσ (XN =xN ,TN =tN |S=s, ®EN = ®eN ),
=
∏
i
Pσ (Xi =xi |S=s, ®Ei = ®ei ).
Consequently, we have
Pσ (X=x|S=s) =
∑
e
P(E=e)
∏
i
Pσ (Xi =xi |S=s, ®Ei = ®ei ),
=
∑
e
P(E=e)
∏
i
Pσ (Xi =xi |S=s)
Pσi ( ®Ei =®ei |Xi =xi , S=s)
P( ®Ei = ®ei )
.
Next, we define Y1(s, x) and Y2(s, x) as
Y1(s, x) : =
∑
e
P(E=e)
∏
i
Pσi ( ®Ei =®ei |Xi =xi , S=s)
P( ®Ei =®ei )
,
Y2(s, x) : =
∏
i
Pσi (Xi =xi |S=s).
It follows that
Pσ ∗ (X=x|W =w) =
∑
s
P(S=s|W =w)Y1(s, x)Y2(s, x).
Let IN be the collection of all permutations on the set indices
I = {1, 2, . . . ,N }. Then, for π ∈ IN , xπ = [x1 . . . xN ]π denotes
the permuted sequence [xπ (1) . . . xπ (N )]. By the symmetry of σ , for
any π ∈ IN , we have that
Y1(s, x) = Y1(sπ , xπ ), Y2(s, x) = Y2(sπ , xπ ).
Consequently, for any π ∈ IN , we have the following:
Pσ (X=x|W =w) =
∑
s∈{0,1}N
P(S=s|W =w)Y1(s, x) Y2(s, x),
=
∑
s∈{0,1}N
P(S=s|W =w) Y1(sπ , xπ )Y2(sπ , xπ ),
=
∑
s∈{0,1}N
P(S=sπ |W =w) Y1(sπ , xπ ) Y2(sπ , xπ ),
=
∑
s∈{0,1}N
P(S=s|W =w) Y1(s, xπ ) Y2(s, xπ ),
Pσ (X = xπ |W = w).
Thus,
Pσ (X=x|W =w) = Pσ
(∑
i
Xi =
∑
i
xi
W =w) .
D PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In what follows, we use a Central Limit Theorem (CLT) for depen-
dence graphs [17] to characterize Pσ (1/√N ∑Ni=1 Xi < y |W = w).
In this proof, for purposes of brevity, we drop the dependency of
Pσ (Xi ) on σ . Similarly, µw , ςw and ςw are used to denote µw (σ ),
ςw (σ ) and ςw (σ ). We firstly present the proof for the case with
W = 1. For convenience, define YN and Y˜N as
YN :=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
Xi , Y˜N :=
YN − E[YN ]√
Var[YN ]
Let Gi j := Gi ∩G j be the set of users who are friends with both i
and j. Recall that ei j = 1 if there is a social tie between i and j. To
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apply the CLT, we first evaluate Var[YN |W = 1]:
Var[YN |W =1]= 1
N
©­«
∑
i, j
P(Xi=X j =1|W=1)−
(∑
i
P(Xi=1|W=1)
)2ª®¬
=
1
N
[ N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=0
1∑
e=0
P(|Gi j |=k,ei j=e)P(Xi=X j=1|W=1,|Gi j |=k,ei j=e)
+
N∑
i=1
P(Xi =1|W =1) −
( N∑
i=1
P(Xi =1|W =1)
)2 ]
.
Next, we turn our attention to the evaluation of P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =e).
If users i and j are friends, and they also have a mutual friend ℓ; then,
{i, j, ℓ} is a 3-cycle in the social graph G. Furthermore, consider the
case where i and j are not friends but they have 2 common friends ℓ
and ℓˆ. Then, {i, j, ℓ, ℓˆ} is a 4-cycle in the social graph G. Let C3(G)
and C4(G) be the set of 3-cycles and 4-cycles in G, respectively. It
follows that
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=1
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =1) ≤
N∑
i, j, ℓ=1,
ℓ,j,i
P({i, j, ℓ} ∈ C3(G)),
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=2
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =0) ≤
N∑
i, j, ℓ, ℓˆ=1,
ℓ,ℓˆ,j,i
P({i, j, ℓ, ℓˆ} ∈ C4(G)).
Then
P({i, j, ℓ} ∈ C3(G)) =
∑
m3
P(|C3(G)| =m3) m3(N
3
) = E[|C3(G)|](N
3
) ,
P({i, j, ℓ, ℓˆ} ∈ C4(G)) =
∑
m4
P(|C4(G)| =m4) m4(N
4
) = E[|C4(G)|](N
4
) .
Consequently,
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=1
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =1) ≤ 6E[|C3 |],
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=2
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =0) ≤ 24E[|C4 |].
A key next step is to quantify E[|C3(G)|] and E[|C4(G)|]. Let D=
[D1 . . .DN ] denote the degree profile. Appealing to Theorem 2 in
[6], we have that |C3(G)| and |C4(G)| are asymptotically indepen-
dent Poisson random variables with conditioned expectations:
E
[
|C3(G)|
D=d] = 16
(∑N
i=1 d
2
i∑N
i=1 di
−1
)3
E
[
|C4(G)|
D=d] = 18
(∑N
i=1 d
2
i∑N
i=1 di
−1
)4
.
It follows that
lim
N→∞E[|C3(G)|] =
1
6 limN→∞E

(∑N
i=1 D
2
i∑N
i=1 Di
− 1
)3 , (36a)
lim
N→∞E[|C3(G)|] =
1
8 limN→∞E

(∑N
i=1 D
2
i∑N
i=1 Di
− 1
)4 . (36b)
For convenience, define Zn and Z˜n for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N } as
follows:
Zn =
(∑n
i=1 D
2
i∑n
i=1 Di
− 1
)4
, Z˜n =
(∑n
i=1 D
2
i∑n
i=1 Di
− 1
)3
.
Next, we show that {Zn : n ≥ 1} is uniformly integrable (UI) as n
grows. If Di > 0, then
Zn ≤
(∑n
i=1 D
2
i∑n
i=1 Di
)4
≤
(∑n
i=1 D
2
i
n
)4
=
1
n4
( ∑
i,j,k,ℓ
D2iD
2
jD
2
kD
2
ℓ
+
n∑
i=1
D8i +
∑
i,j
(4D6iD2j + 3D4iD4j ) +
∑
i,j,k
6D4iD
2
jD
2
k
)
.
Then, from Assumption 1, for some 0 < δ < △/2 it directly follows
that
E
[(∑
D4iD
4
j
/
n4
)1+δ ]
<1<∞,E
[(∑
D8i
/
n4
)1+δ ]
< n−2(1+δ )<∞,
E
[(∑
D2iD
2
jD
2
kD
2
ℓ
/
n4
)1+δ ] ≤ (E [D2+2δ ] n−1−δ )4 < ∞,
E
[(∑
D6iD
2
j
/
n4
)1+δ ]
< E
[
D2+2δ
]
n−
7
4 (1+δ ) < ∞,
E
[(∑
D4iD
2
jD
2
k
/
n4
)1+δ ]
<
(
E
[
D2+2δ
] )2
< ∞.
Thus, Zn is UI [5]. Clearly, if Zn is UI for Di > 0, then Zn is also UI
for Di ≥ 0. Since |Z˜n | ≤ Zn and Zn is UI, it follows that Z˜n is also
UI. Therefore, the limits and expectations can be interchanged in
(36). Then
lim
N→∞E[|C3(G)|]=
1
6E

©­«
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 D
2
i
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 Di
−1ª®¬
3 =
1
6
(
E[D2]
E[D] −1
)3
,
lim
N→∞E[|C4(G)|]=
1
8E

©­«
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 D
2
i
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 Di
−1ª®¬
4 =
1
8
(
E[D2]
E[D] −1
)4
.
Consequently, we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=1
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =1) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(
E[D2]
E[D] −1
)3
=0,
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i, j=1,
j,i
N−2∑
k=2
P(|Gi j |=k, ei j =0) ≤ lim
N→∞
3
N
(
E[D2]
E[D] −1
)4
=0.
Next, we evaluate the expected number of user pairs (i, j) such that i
and j are friends with no common friend, and vice versa. Appealing
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to [25], we have that
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1, j,i
P(|Gi j | = 0, ei j = 1) ·
P(Xi = X j = 1|W = 1, |Gi j | = 0, ei j = 1) = ς1E[D],
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1, j,i
P(|Gi j | = 1, ei j = 0) ·
P(Xi = X j = 1|W = 1, |Gi j | = 1, ei j = 0) = ς˜1(E[D2] − E[D]).
For the case with |Gi j | = 0 and ei j = 0, we have that
P(|Gi j | = 0, ei j = 0) = 1 − P(|Gi j | ≥ 1, ei j = 0) − P(ei j = 1),
P(Xi = X j = 1|W = 1, |Gi j | = 0, ei j = 0) = µ21 .
Then,
lim
N→∞
1
N
(∑
i,j
P(|Gi j |=0,ei j=0)P(Xi=X j=1|W=1,|Gi j |=0,ei j=0)
−
(∑
i
P(Xi =1|W =1)
)2 )
= −µ21
(
1 + E[D2]
)
.
Consequently, for Var[YN |W = 1] we have that
lim
N→∞Var[YN |W =1]=µ1−µ
2
1+E[D] (ς1−ς˜1)+E[D2]
(
ς˜1−µ21
)
=κ1.
Similarly, the variance of YN givenW =0 is computed as
lim
N→∞Var[YN |W =0] = limN→∞Var
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(1−Xi ) |W =0
]
,
= (1−µ0)−(1−µ0)2+E[D]
(
ς00−ς10
)
+E[D2]
(
ς10−(1−µ0)2
)
.
Next, appealing to Theorem 2 of [17], we have that for γ < 2/3,
lim
N→∞
(
N
Dmax
)γ (Dmax)2/N
Var[YN |W =1] → 0.
Thus, it follows that conditioned onW = w ,
lim
N→∞
YN − E[YN |W = w]√
Var[YN |W = w]
= lim
N→∞
∑N
i=1 Xi − N µw√
Nκw
d−→ N (0, 1).
E PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider the payment mechanism defined in (16a) and (16b). When
other users use σ ∗−i , the expected utility of user i at strategy σ
′
i is
given as
Ui (σ ′i ,σ ∗−i ) = E(σ ′i ,σ ∗−i )
[
R˜i (X) − д
(
ζ (σ ′i ,Ci )
) ]
=
∑
di
ρdi ·∑
ci
P(Ci =ci |Di =di )
∑
si
P(Si =si |Ci =ci )
∑
xi
Pσ ′i (Xi =xi |Ti =ti ) ·∑
w
PW(w |Ti =ti )E(σ ′i ,σ ∗−i )
[
R˜i (X)−д(ζ (σ ′i ,Ci ))
Ti =ti ,Xi =xi ,W =w]
Next, observe that
E(σ ′i ,σ ∗−i )
[
R˜i (X) − д(ζ (σ ′i ,Ci ))
Ti =ti ,Xi =xi ,W =w]
= Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (xi ,X−i )|Ti =ti ,W =w
] − д (ζ (σ ′i , ci ))
where the equality follows from the conditional independence be-
tween Xi and X−i given Ti andW . When the payment mechanism
in (16a) and (16b) is applied, we have that
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (1,X−i )|Ti=ti ,W=w
]
=Z1Pσ ∗−i (M−i=1|Ti=ti ,W=w) (37a)
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (0,X−i )|Ti=ti ,W=w
]
=Z0Pσ ∗−i (M−i=0|Ti=ti ,W=w) (37b)
Recall that Gi is the set of user i’s friends and Gi is the set of her
second neighbors, i.e. friends of her friends. In the case of Di = 0,
givenXi ,Ti = [Si ] is conditionally independent fromX−i . However,
for Di > 0, in general, Ti is correlated with the reported data of
users from Gi and G¯i . It can be shown that
Pσ ∗−i (M−i = 1|Ti = ti ,W = w)
= Pσ ∗−i
©­­«
∑
j ∈Gi∪G i
X j +
∑
ℓ∈I\(Gi∪G¯i )
Xℓ > N△
 Ti =ti ,W =wª®®¬ .
Since, Xi ’s are Bernoulli random variables we have
Pσ ∗−i
©­­«
∑
ℓ∈I\(Gi∪G i )
Xℓ > N△
W =wª®®¬ < Pσ ∗−i (M−i =1|Ti =ti ,W =w)
< Pσ ∗−i
©­­«
∑
ℓ∈I\(Gi∪G i )
Xℓ > N△−|Gi ∪Gi |
W =wª®®¬ .
Under Assumption 1 the maximal degreeD is bounded and hence
|Gi ∪ Gi | is also bounded. Then, using a Sandwich argument, it
can be shown that when the population size N is large, P(M−i =
1|Ti = ti ,W =w) can be well approximated by P(M−i = 1|W =w)
and that P(M−i = 0|Ti = ti ,W =w) by P(M−i = 0|W =w). Recall
that β0 = P(M−i = 0|W = 0) and β1 = P(M−i = 1|W = 1). Then the
expected rewards in (37) can be written as
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (1,X−i )|W=1
]
=Z1β1,Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (0,X−i )|W=1
]
=Z0(1−β1),
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (0,X−i )|W=0
]
=Z0β0,Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (1,X−i )|W=0
]
=Z1(1−β0).
Along the same lin as in the proof of Lemma 1, we can write the
expected reward of user i at the strategy σ ′i in terms of p(si , ci ) and
q(si , ci ) as follows:
E(σ ′i ,σ ∗−i )
[
R˜i (X)|Di = di
]
=
∑
ci
P(Ci = ci |Di = di ) ·∑
si
p(si , ci ) K(si , ci ) + q(si , ci ) L(si , ci )
where K(si , ci ) = P(Si = si |Ci = ci )
∑
w
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (1,X−i )|W = w
]
× P(W = w |Si = si ,Ci = ci ),
L(si , ci ) = P(Si = si |Ci = ci )
∑
w
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (0,X−i )|W = w
]
× P(W = w |Si = si ,Ci = ci ).
It can be shown that K(si , ci ) and L(si , ci ) are positive for every
si and ci . Therefore, by the proof of Lemma 1, non-participation
decision cannot be the best response and hence p(si , ci )+q(si , ci ) =
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1. The privacy level depends solely on p(1, ci ) and p(0, ci ) and the
privacy level corresponding to strategy σ ′i (ti ) can be written as:
ζ (σ ′i , ci ) = max
{ ln (p(1, ci )p(0, ci )
) , ln ( 1−p(1, ci )1−p(0, ci )
) }.
For brevity, we denote the cost function as д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci )). The
expected utility can be written as
E(σ ′i ,σ ∗−i )
[
R˜i (X) − д
(
ζ (σ ′i ,Ci )
) |Di =di ] =∑
ci
P(Ci = ci |Di = di )·(
p(1, ci )K(1, ci ) + p(0, ci )K(0, ci ) + K(ci ) − д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci ))
)
where K(si , ci ) and K(ci ) are defined as
K(si , ci ) := K(si , ci ) − L(si , ci ), K(ci ) := L(1, ci ) + L(0, ci ). (39)
Recall that fi denotes the sum signal fi =
∑
j ∈Gi ci j . For conve-
nience define
Y1 := θ
fi
1 (1−θ1)di−fi , Y0 := θ
di−fi
1 (1−θ1)fi .
It follows that K(1, ci ) and K(0, ci ) can be written as
K(1, ci ) = Z θ0Y1 − (1 − θ0)Y0PW (1)Y1 + PW (0)Y0 , (40a)
K(0, ci ) = Z (1 − θ0)Y1 − θ0Y0PW (1)Y1 + PW (0)Y0 , (40b)
Note that, K(si , ci ) and K(ci ) can also be written as K(si , fi ) and
K(fi ). Furthermore, (40) has the form of (33) from Appendix B.
Therefore, the rest of the proof follows directly from the proof of
Theorem 1.
F PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In Algorithm 1, the optimal SR privacy level η∗ can be found by
solving the first order condition J ′(η∗)=0. It follows from (40) that,
if fi ≤ di/2 − A¯, the user plays the ND strategy with p(1, fi ) =
p(0, fi )= 0 and τ0 ≤ A¯. Similarly, if fi ≥ di/2 + A¯, user plays the
ND strategy with p(1, ci )=p(0, ci )=1 and τ1 ≤ A¯. Recall that h(fi )
is defined in Appendix B. For fi < di/2, we have that
h(fi )=Z θ0e
η∗+1−θ0−(θ0+(1−θ0)eη∗ )(θ1/(1−θ1))di−2fi
(pW (1)+(θ1/(1−θ1))di−2fi )
−д(η∗).
It follows that for fi < di/2, the condition h(fi ) > 0 for playing
the SR strategy reduces to
fi >
di
2 −
log
(
eη
∗
θ0+1−θ0−PW (1)(2θ0−1)2eη∗д(η∗)(eη∗+1)/(д′(ϵ )eϵ+1)2)
eη∗ (1−θ0)+θ0+PW (0)(2θ0−1)2eη∗д(η∗)(eη∗+1)/(д′(ϵ )(eϵ+1)2)
)
2 log(θ1/(1 − θ1)) ,
which yieldsA0(η∗). Similarly, for fi > di/2, the conditionh(ci ) > 0
for playing the SR strategy reduces to
fi <
di
2 +
log
(
eη
∗ (1−θ0)+θ0+PW (1)(2θ0−1)2eη∗д(η∗)(eη∗+1)/(д′(ϵ )eϵ+1)2)
eη∗θ0+1−θ0−PW (0)(2θ0−1)2eη∗д(η∗)(eη∗+1)/(д′(ϵ )(eϵ+1)2)
)
2 log(θ1/(1 − θ1)) ,
which yields A1(η∗).
G PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
(I) In what follows, we first evaluate µ1(σ ∗). Note that
µ1(σ ∗) = Pσ ∗ (Xi =1|W =1) = Pσ ∗ (Fi > Di/2+τ |W =1)
+ λ(ϵ)Pσ ∗ (Fi ∈ [Di/2−τ , Di/2+τ ]|W =1),
= Eρ [Γ (⌊D/2+τ+1⌋ ,D;D,θ1)+λ(ϵ)Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D,θ1)] ,
where λ(ϵ) is defined as
λ(ϵ) := Pσ ∗ (Xi =1|W =1,Di =0) = θ0e
ϵ +1−θ0
eϵ +1 .
(II) For convenience, Jkℓ and J˜kℓ are defined for k, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}
as follows:
Jkℓ := Pσ ∗ (Xi = 1|W = 1,Bi j = 0, Ei j = 1, Si = k,Ci j = ℓ),
J˜kℓ := Pσ ∗ (Xi = 1|W = 1,Bi j = 0, Ei j = 1, Si = k, Sj = ℓ).
Next, we also define Fi,−j as follows:
Fi,−j =
∑
ℓ∈Gi \{j }
Ciℓ .
Recall that
ρ˜d := P(Di =d |Di > 0)=
{
0, if d=0;
ρd/(1−ρ0), else.
Rewrite Jkℓ as
Jkℓ = Pσ ∗ (Fi,−j > τ−ℓ+D/2|W =1,D > 0)
+
keϵ +1−k
eϵ +1 Pσ
∗ (Fi,−j ∈ [D/2−τ−ℓ, D/2+τ−ℓ]|W =1,D > 0)
= Eρ˜
[
Γ
(⌊
D
2 + τ + 1 − ℓ
⌋
,D − 1;D − 1,θ1
)
+
keϵ + 1 − k
eϵ +1 Γ
(
D
2 − τ − ℓ,
D
2 + τ − ℓ;D − 1,θ1
) ]
and J˜kℓ can be written in terms of Jkℓ as
J˜kℓ = (1 − α)Jkℓ + αJk (1−ℓ).
(III) Next, we define µ˜1(σ ∗) as the the mean of Xi at strategy
profile σ when it is given thatW =1 and i has at least one friend:
µ˜1(σ ∗) := Pσ ∗ [Xi = 1|W = 1,Di > 0].
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that the probability of users
i and j being friends and having an common friend together is
negligible. Thus, µ˜1(σ ∗) can be written in terms of J˜kℓ :
µ˜1(σ ∗)=
∑
si ,k
P(Si =si , Sj =k |W =1)Pσ ∗ (Xi =1|W =1, Si =si , Sj =k),
= θ20 J˜11 + (1−θ0)2J˜00 + θ0(1−θ0)(J˜01 + J˜10).
After some algebra, µ˜1(σ ∗) can also be written in terms of Jkℓ as
µ˜1 = θ0((1−α)J11+αJ10) + (1−θ0)((1−α)J00+αJ01) +V1
whereV1 is defined as
V1 := θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α)(J10 + J01 − J00 − J11).
Observe that
V1 =θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α)(eϵ −1)/(eϵ +1)
× Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)−γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)] .
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For small α , it follows from Corollary 2 that τ is small and we have
Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)−γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)]  0.
Thus, µ˜1 >> V1. On the other hand, for large α , we have very small
(1−2α) and hence µ˜1 >> V1. It follows that
µ˜1(σ ∗)  θ0((1−α)J11+αJ10) + (1−θ0)((1−α)J00+αJ01).
(IV) Next, we evaluate ς1(σ ∗):
ς1(σ ∗) = Pσ ∗ (Xi = X j = 1|W = 1,Bi j = 0, Ei j = 1),
=
∑
si ,sj
P(Si =si , Sj =sj |W =1)
∑
k, ℓ
P(Ci j =k,Cji =ℓ |Si =si , Sj =sj )
×Pσ ∗ (Xi =1|W =1,Si =si ,Ci j =k)Pσ ∗ (X j =1|W =1,Sj =sj ,Cji =ℓ),
= θ20 ((1−α)2J 211+α2J 210+2α(1−α)J10J11)
+ (1−θ0)2((1−α)2J 200+α2J 201+2α(1−α)J01J00)
+2θ0(1−θ0)((1−α)2J10J01+α2J11J00+α(1−α)(J10J00+J11J01)).
After some algebra, ς1(σ ∗) can be written as
ς1(σ ∗) = (θ0((1−α)J11+αJ10) + (1−θ0)((1−α)J00+αJ01))2+V0
whereV0 is defined as
V0 = 2θ0(1 − θ0)(1 − 2α)(J01J10 − J11J00).
Observe that,V0 can be expressed as
V0 = 2θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α)e
ϵ −1
eϵ +1
(
Eρ˜ [Γ (⌊D/2+τ+1⌋ ,D−1;D−1,θ1)]
× Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)−γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)]
+ Eρ˜ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D−1,θ1)]Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)]
)
.
For small α , it follows from Corollary 2 that τ is small and
Eρ˜ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D−1,θ1)]  0,
Eρ˜ [γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)−γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)]  0.
Thus, ς1 >> V0. On the other hand, for large α , we have very small
(1−2α) and hence ς1 >> V0. It follows that
ς1  (θ0((1−α)J11+αJ10) + (1−θ0)((1−α)J00+αJ01))2 . (41)
(V) Next, we refer to the observation from the Proof of Lemma 3
that the probability of users i and j having more than one common
friend together is negligible. Thus, ς˜1(σ ∗) can be evaluated as:
ς˜1 = Pσ ∗ (Xi =X j =1|W =1,Bi j =1, Ei j =0)=
∑
sℓ
P(Sℓ =sℓ |W =1)
× Pσ ∗ (Xi =X j =1|W =1, Eiℓ =Ejℓ =1,Biℓ =Bjℓ =0, Sℓ =sℓ)
=
∑
sℓ
P(Sℓ =sℓ |W =1)P2σ ∗ (Xi =1|W =1, Eiℓ =1,Biℓ =0, Sℓ =sℓ)
=θ0(θ0J˜11 + (1−θ0)J˜01)2 + (1−θ0)(θ0J˜10+(1−θ0)J˜00)2.
After some algebra, ς˜1(σ ∗) can also be written as:
ς˜1= µ˜
2
1+θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α)(θ0(J11−J10)+(1−θ0)(J01−J00)). (42)
(VI) Recall the definition of κ1(σ ∗):
κ1 = µ1 − µ21 + E[D] (ς1 − ς˜1) + E[D2]
(
ς˜1 − µ21
)
,
= µ1−µ21 + E[D2](µ˜21−µ21)+E[D] (ς1−ς˜1)+E[D2](ς˜1− µ˜21).
From (41) and (42), it follows that
E[D] (ς1(σ ∗)−ς˜1(σ ∗))+E[D2](ς˜1(σ ∗)− µ˜21(σ ∗)) = △(E[D2]−E[D])
where △ is defined as
△ := θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α)(θ0(J11−J10)+(1−θ0)(J01−J00)).
After some algebra, △ can be found as
△ := θ0(1−θ0)(1−2α) Eρ˜ [(eϵ (1−θ0)+θ0) γ (⌊D/2+τ ⌋ ;D−1,θ1)
+ (θ0eϵ +1−θ0)γ (⌈D/2−τ−1⌉ ;D−1,θ1)]/(eϵ + 1).
For convenience, we define
△˜ = µ˜21 − µ21 .
Note that, we have
µ˜1 = (µ1 − ρ0λ)/(1 − ρ0).
Thus,
△˜ := ρ0(1−ρ0)2
(
µ21(2−ρ0) − 2µ1λ + ρ0λ2
)
.
Consequently, κ1(σ ∗) can be written as:
κ1 = µ1−µ21 + △˜E[D2] + △(E[D2]−E[D]).
(VII) Next, we evaluate µ0(σ ∗):
µ0(σ ∗) = Pσ ∗ (Xi =1|W =0) = Pσ ∗ (Fi > Di/2+τ |W =0)
+ (1−λ(ϵ))Pσ ∗ (Fi ∈ [Di/2−τ , Di/2+τ ]|W =0),
= Eρ [Γ (⌊D/2+τ+1⌋ ,D;D, 1−θ1)]
+ (1 − λ(ϵ))Eρ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D, 1−θ1)].
Observe that
Eρ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D, 1−θ1)] = Eρ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D,θ1)],
Eρ [Γ (⌊D/2+τ+1⌋ ,D;D, 1−θ1)]
= 1−Eρ [Γ (D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D,θ1)]−Eρ [Γ (⌊D/2+τ+1⌋ ,D;D,θ1)].
Thus, it follows that
µ0=1−Eρ [Γ(⌊D/2+τ+1⌋,D;D,θ1)]−λEρ [Γ(D/2−τ , D/2+τ ;D,θ1)],
= 1 − µ1.
(VIII) Recall the definition of κ0(σ ∗):
κ0 = µ0(1−µ0)+E[D] (ς0−ς˜0)+E[D2]
(
ς˜0 − (1 − µ0)2
)
.
Note that, we have
Pσ ∗ (Xi = 0|W = 0, Si = s,Ci j = k)
= Pσ ∗ (Xi = 1|W = 1, Si = 1 − s,Ci j = 1 − k)
and
Pσ ∗ (Xi = 0|W = 0, Eiℓ = 1,Biℓ = 0, Sℓ = s)
= Pσ ∗ (Xi = 1|W = 1, Eiℓ = 1,Biℓ = 0, Sℓ = 1 − s).
Thus,
ς1(σ ∗) = ς0(σ ∗), ς˜1(σ ∗) = ς˜0(σ ∗).
Consequently,
κ0(σ ∗) = µ1(1−µ1)+E[D](ς1−ς˜1)+E[D2](ς˜1−µ21) = κ1(σ ∗).
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H PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We consider the payment mechanism R˜ that is proposed in Theo-
rem 2. The expected payment to user i at σ ∗ can be written as
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)|Di =d]=
d∑
f =0
P(Fi = f |Di =d)Eσ ∗ [R˜(X)|Fi = f ,Di =d].
For convenience, define K i (s, f ,d) and K i (f ,d) as:
K i (s, f ,d)=P(Si =s |Fi = f ,Di =d)
1∑
w=0
PW (w |Si =s, Fi = f ,Di =d)
×
(
Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (1,X−i )|W = w
] − Eσ ∗−i [R˜i (0,X−i )|W = w ] ) ,
K i (f ,d)=
1∑
w=0
PW (w |Fi = f ,Di =d) Eσ ∗−i
[
R˜i (0,X−i )|W = w
]
.
It follows from the Proof of Theorem 2 that we have
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)|Fi = f ,Di =d]
=

K i (f ,d) if fi < di/2 − τ ,
K i (f ,d)+K i (1, f ,d)+K i (0, f ,d) if fi > di/2 + τ ,
K i (f ,d) +
(
K i (1, f ,d)eϵ + K i (0, f ,d)
)
1
eϵ+1
if di/2 − τ ≤ fi ≤ di/2 + τ .
Thus,
Eσ ∗ [R˜(X)|Di =d] =
d∑
f = ⌊d/2+τ+1⌋
P(Fi = f |Di =d)
(
K i (1, f ,d)+K i (0, f ,d)
)
+
⌊d/2+τ ⌋∑
f = ⌈d/2−τ ⌉
P(Fi = f |Di =d) K i (1, f ,d)e
ϵ +K i (0, f ,d)
1 + eϵ
+
d∑
f =0
P(Fi = f |Di =d)K i (f ,d).
Recall that Z (ϵ) is defined in the Proof of Theorem 2 as:
Z (ϵ) = д
′(ϵ)(eϵ + 1)2
2eϵ .
We have that
K i (1, f ,d) + K i (0, f ,d) = 2Z (ϵ)(2θ0 − 1)−1
× (PW (1|Fi = f ,Di =d) − PW (0|Fi = f ,Di =d)) .
By the definition of ν sr(d,τ ) and νnd(d,τ ) (23), we have that
ν sr(d,τ ) = P(Fi ∈ [d/2 − τ , d/2 + τ ]|W = 1,Di = d),
= P(Fi ∈ [d/2 − τ , d/2 + τ ]|W = 0,Di = d);
νnd(d,τ ) = P(Fi > d/2 + τ ]|W = 1,Di = d),
= P(Fi < d/2 − τ ]|W = 0,Di = d).
Thus, we have that
d∑
f = ⌊d/2+τ+1⌋
P(Fi = f |Di =d)
(
K i (1, f ,d)+K i (0, f ,d)
)
=
Z (ϵ)
2θ0−1
×
d∑
f = ⌊d/2+τ+1⌋
P(Fi = f |W =1,Di =d)−P(Fi = f |W =0,Di =d)
= д′(ϵ)(eϵ +1)2/(2eϵ (2θ0−1))(2νnd(d,τ ) + ν sr(d,τ ) − 1).
Following the same rationale, we have
d/2+τ∑
f =d/2−τ
1
1 + eϵ P(Fi = f |Di = d)
(
K i (1, f ,d)eϵ + K i (0, f ,d)
)
= νsr (d,τ ) Z (ϵ) e
ϵ − 1
eϵ + 1 .
Note that we have β = β1 = β0 under equal priors assumption, and
then it follows that
d∑
f =0
P(Fi = f |Di =d)K i (f ,d) = Z (ϵ) 1(2θ0 − 1)(2β − 1) .
Consequently, after some algebra, Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)|Di =d] can be written
as
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)|Di =d]= Z (ϵ)2θ0−1
(
2 − 2β
2β − 1 + 2ν
nd(d,τ ) + 2λν sr(d,τ )
)
where λ is defined in Theorem 3 as λ = (eϵθ0 + 1−θ0)/(eϵ +1).
Taking expectations of both sides over ρ gives as:
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)] = 2Z (ϵ)2θ0−1
(
1 − β
2β − 1 + E[ν
nd(D,τ )] + λE[ν sr(D,τ )]
)
.
Note that we have Z1 = Z0 under equal priors assumptions as
follows:
Z = Z1 = Z0 =
2Z (ϵ)
(2β − 1)(2θ0 − 1) .
Thus, we have that
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)] = Z
(
1 − β + µ1(σ
∗)
2β − 1
)
.
As a result, we have that
N∑
i=1
Eσ ∗ [R˜i (X)] = Z
(
1 − β + µ1(σ
∗)
2β − 1
)
N .
I PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Recall that σnd is defined as the strategy profile at which the users
determine their reported data as the majority bit of their group
signals:
Pσ nd (Xi =1|Si =si , Fi = fi ) =

1 if fi > di/2,
0 if fi < di/2,
0.5 else;
Pσ nd (Xi =0|Si =si , Fi = fi ) = 1 − Pσ nd (Xi =0|Si =si , Fi = fi ).
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(I) First, we evaluate Pσ nd (M−i = 1|W = 1) and Pσ nd (M−i = 1|W =
1). Following the rationale presented in the Proof of Proposition 2,
we can find µ1(σnd) and µ0(σnd) as follows:
µ1
(
σnd
)
= 1−µ0
(
σnd
)
= E
[
Γ
(
D+1
2 ,D;D,θ1
)
+
1
2γ
(
D
2 ;D,θ1
)]
.
When users i and j friends without any common friend, their re-
ported data is conditionally independent givenW =w at σnd since
Xi is independent from Si and X j is independent from Sj givenW :
Pσ nd (Xi =X j =w |W =w, Si =si , Sj =sj , Ei j =1,Bi j =0) =
Pσ nd (Xi =w |W =w,Sj=sj ,Ei j =1)Pσ nd (X j =w |W =w,Si=si ,Ei j =1).
Thus,
ς1
(
σnd
)
= ς0
(
σnd
)
= P2σ nd (Xi =w |W =w,Di > 0),
= E2ρ˜ [Γ ((D+1)/2,D;D,θ1) + 0.5γ (D/2;D,θ1)] .
Next, we evaluate ς˜1 and ς˜0. For convenience, define Jk for k ∈
{0, 1} as follows:
Jk :=Pσ nd (Xi =1|W =1, Eiℓ =1,Ciℓ =k)
=Eρ˜
[
Γ
(
D+1
2 −k,D−1;D−1,θ1
)
+
1
2γ
(
D
2 −k ;D−1,θ1
)]
.
Furthermore, note that
Jk = Pσ nd (Xi = 0|W = 0, Eiℓ = 1,Ciℓ = 1 − k).
Thus, we have ς˜1(σnd) = ς˜0(σnd) and ς˜1(σnd) can be written as
ς˜1(σnd) = θ0 (αJ0+(1−α)J1)2+(1−θ0) (αJ1+(1−α)J0)2 .
Consequently, we have that
κ1(σnd) = κ0(σnd).
Appealing to Lemma 3, for sufficiently large N , we have that
Pσ nd (M−i = 1|W = 1) = Pσ nd (M−i = 0|W = 0) = βnd
where
βnd = Φ
(√
N − 1
κ1(σnd)
(
µ1
(
σnd
) − 12 )
)
.
Next we consider a payment mechanism Rnd that is constructed
based on the payment mechanism R˜ where the mechanism design
parameters Z0 and Z1 are determined as the following:
Z0 = δ
PW (1)βnd + PW (0)(1 − βnd)
(2βnd − 1)(2θ0−1)PW (1)PW (0))
,
Z1 = δ
PW (1)(1 − βnd) + PW (0)βnd
(2βnd − 1)(2θ0−1)PW (1)PW (0))
,
where δ > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive number. Note that, Z0
and Z1 are well defined since µ1
(
σnd
)
> 0.5 and βnd > 0.5.
(II)Next, we prove that σnd is a BNE in Rnd payment mechanism.
From the Proof of Theorem 2, it follows that the expected utility of
user i at strategy σ ′i when other users use σ
nd
−i can be found as
E(σ ′i ,σ nd−i )
[
Rndi (X) − д
(
ζ (σ ′i ,Ci )
) |Di =di ] =∑
ci
P(Ci = ci |Di = di )·(
p(1, ci )K(1, ci ) + p(0, ci )K(0, ci ) + K(ci ) − д(p(1, ci ),p(0, ci ))
)
where K(si , ci ) and K(ci ) are found as
K(1, ci )= δ2θ0−1
θ0θ
fi
1 (1−θ1)di−fi −(1 − θ0)(1−θ1)fiθ
di−fi
1
PW (1)θ fi1 (1−θ1)di−fi + PW (0)(1−θ1)fiθ
di−fi
1
,
K(0, ci )= δ2θ0−1
(1 − θ0)θ fi1 (1−θ1)di−fi − θ0(1−θ1)fiθ
di−fi
1
PW (1)θ fi1 (1−θ1)di−fi + PW (0)(1−θ1)fiθ
di−fi
1
.
By Lemma 1, it suffices to consider SR and ND strategies for σ ′i (ti ).
From the Proof of Theorem 2, we have the following results:
(a) SR Strategies: The optimal privacy level ξ ∗ (ci ) can be found
by solving the first order condition J ′(φ) = 0:
J ′(φ) =
(
K(1, ci ) − K(0, ci )
) eφ
(eφ + 1)2 − д
′(φ), φ ≥ 0.
For any φ > 0, we have д(ξ ∗) > 0. Hence, ξ ∗(ci ) = 0, since since δ
is an arbitrarily small positive constant. It implies that user i tosses
a fair coin when she employs SR strategies.
(b) ND Strategies: When user i employs the optimal ND strategy,
her reported data as follows:
Pσ ′i (Xi = 1|Ti = ti ) = (sgn(K(1, ci ) + K(0, ci )) + 1)/2.
Note that, this strategy corresponds to σnd.
From Theorem 2, we have that the best response strategy of
user i is employing the SR strategy if fi = di/2. For fi , di/2, we
defined h(ci ) in (34) such that, the best response strategy is the ND
strategy if h(ci ) < 0 and the SR strategy if h(ci ) > 0. In the payment
mechanism Rnd, h(ci ) renders to the following:
h(ci )=

0.5K(1, ci ) + 0.5K(0, ci ) if fi < di/2
−0.5K(1, ci ) − 0.5K0,ci if fi > di/2.
It is clear that K(1, ci ) + K(0, ci ) > 0 if fi > di/2 and K(1, ci ) +
K(0, ci ) < 0 if fi < di/2. Consequently, σndis a BNE in Rnd.
(III) Finally, we compute the expected total payment at σnd.
Appealing to Theorem 3, we have that
N∑
i=1
Eσ nd [Rndi (X)] =
2δ
(2βnd − 1)(2θ0 − 1)
(
1−βnd + µ1(σ
∗)
2βnd − 1
)
N .
Recall that δ > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive number. Thus,
N∑
i=1
Eσ nd [Rndi (X)] = δ˜N
where δ˜ > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive number.
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